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ABSTRACT 
Pakistan has a peculiar information environment that has not been researched in 
detail. The dynamics of the information environment have changed in urban 
areas due to technological advancements; however, the rural areas are still far 
from the effects of such advancements. This thesis explores the peculiarities of 
the information environment in Pakistan and draws lessons from the Sri Lankan 
fight with the LTTE and U.S. efforts to contain terrorism (on U.S. soil) since 9/11. 
It brings out the root causes of terrorism in Pakistan and the role played by the 
information environment in strengthening this menace (especially Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan). The thesis is useful in learning the ways and means to 
optimally utilize the information environment of Pakistan for fighting terrorism. It 
might also be beneficial in formulating an information policy for Pakistan, for long- 
and short-term effects. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Pakistan has suffered a lot from the menace of terrorism. The security forces of 
Pakistan have given away more than 7,000 lives, and financial loss has reached 
more than $68 billion. Pakistan also fears that the increased involvement of India 
in Afghan affairs may turn it into a proxy war. The serious concerns and issues 
faced by Pakistan necessitate a clear and effective approach to fight terrorism in 
the country. This research focuses on maligning the information environment use 
by terrorists groups and use of this environment to fight terrorism. 
The research work starts with the importance of understanding the 
information environment in general and of Pakistan in particular. The frame work 
of discussion on the information environment is set as the use of information, 
physical and cognitive domains by individuals, organizations, and system (based 
on U.S. Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations). Having looked at the 
information environment in general, the thesis focuses on the information 
environment of Pakistan where keeping pace with technological advancements 
of the world is considered more of a luxury than necessity. Other basic needs of 
society take priority in Pakistan. The government has not managed the 
information environment, whereas terrorist organizations are making effective 
use of it to target their audiences. To limit the scope, research is limited to 
religious extremism and in particular Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Birth of 
the TTP, its objectives, leadership, strength, support from national and 
international players, and structural weaknesses, are discussed in detail. 
The Sri Lankan government defeat of LTTE and U.S. measures to prevent 
terrorism on its soil after 9/11 are evaluated. Pertinent lessons are drawn from 
these models for inclusion in Pakistan’s management of the information 
environment. Sri Lankan government grand strategy of define, isolate and defeat, 
and especially the measures to isolate the LTTE merited attention. The U.S. use 
of technology (fusion centers) and public awareness to report unusual matters, 
has increased the eyes and ears of counter-terrorism force in pre-empting any 
 xx 
terrorist plan. Next, we look at the theories of Maurice Tugwell (psychological 
strategy of terrorism) and Gordon McCormick (influenced the process of 
terrorism), to evaluate why terrorists use information operations. The research 
covers the way Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is making use of information 
environment to effectively influence different target audiences—making use of 
religious propaganda for pro-TTP and using coercive measures to deter anti-TTP 
audience.  
The thesis provides countermeasures for the control of terrorism in 
Pakistan at individual and system/organizational levels. An overarching strategy 
is suggested to isolate and curtail religious terrorism. The internal differences of 
TTP, following of inaccurate scripts, and a need to stop the support from foreign 
elements, are highlighted in detail. Some very specific U.S. technological 
measures of networking complete criminal and terrorist data, (fusion centers) 
have been suggested. The complexity of the situation has also been captured in 
a system dynamics model, for the ease of decision making and analysis of 
various measures. The thesis concludes with issues that merit attention before 
making any serious endeavor to manage the information environment of 
Pakistan. Will any democratic government be able to carry out political reforms, 
like limiting the role of religion in politics and eliminating support of terrorist 
organizations for political gains, without the fear of losing popular support? Will 
Pakistan be able to limit the role of international players in its internal affairs 
(support of terrorist outfits), through diplomatic efforts? 
 xxi 
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There’s a war out there old friend—a world war. And it’s not about 
who’s got the most bullets; it’s about who controls the information. 




The Information boom that the civilized world has seen in the last century 
has had multi-faceted effects in almost all domains of life. People today are more 
aware, exposed, and learned as compared to people of the past. Information 
streaming has added complexities to the world in addition to positive effects on 
society. Terrorism being the most dangerous of all social evils, has also found its 
way into cyber world. It is serving them to attract fresh recruits, keep their 
networks alive, finance their heinous acts, and organize actions. Developed 
countries are cognizant of this fact and therefore, have developed ways and 
means to monitor such illicit activities in the information domain. The developing 
world is still struggling to keep pace with this technology because of their 
financial constraints. Pakistan is one such developing nation, which has a 
peculiar problem of being situated in the heart of terrorist infested areas. The 
Importance of adopting modern infrastructure in information domain becomes 
very important for Pakistan.  
Terrorism has been recognized in its current shape after September 11, 
2001. Pakistan emerged as a key player because of its geographical location and 
its role in ousting the U.S.S.R from Afghanistan. Terrorists have been observed 
making use of the information environment for the spread of terrorism, 
recruitment and their operational requirements. The effective use of the 
information environment has helped terrorists achieve their objectives. Pakistan 
has had multiple root causes for the birth and spread of terrorism. The extremism 
in Pakistan flourished during the Afghan Jihad in 80’s, which also served the 
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purpose of keeping the Kashmiri freedom struggle alive. This environment helped 
the extremist thoughts to prosper in a heavily populous and economically weak 
country. The range of terrorist groups spread from sectarian issues, Kashmir 
support, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Balochistan 
Liberation Army and politically supported hooligans. Violence in Pakistan has 
been on the rise since 2004, as terrorist groups have targeted political leaders, 
military, police, tribal leaders and minority Shia sect. The rarely heard 
phenomenon of suicide attacks has become a routine in terrorist attacks. The 
Taliban associated with Al-Qaeda has formed a network by finding common 
cause with terrorist groups that target Shia and those with criminal enterprises in 
Karachi. Adding to the problems of a poorly governed country, terrorism and the 
law and order situation appear to be the biggest worries and hurdles on 
Pakistan’s path to prosperity. Information technology has given recognition to the 
terrorist groups. Terrorists reach out to the public through press releases and 
videos, websites, and radio broadcasts. The open media, which gained strength 
during President Pervez Musharraf’s era of government, gives full coverage to 
the activities of terrorist groups and paves their way to greater popularity. 
While fighting terrorists, the security forces of Pakistan have lost more 
than 7,000 lives and financial losses have reached $68 billion.1 Pakistan also 
fears that the increased involvement of India in Afghan affairs may turn it into a 
proxy war. The serious concerns and issues faced by Pakistan necessitate a 
clear and effective approach to fight terrorism in the country. This research 
focuses on undermining the information environment use by terrorists groups and 
using this environment to fight terrorism.   
                                            
1 Dawn News, “Terrorism: Pakistan’s Sacrifices,” November 13, 2012, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/763615/terrorism-pakistans-sacrifices. 
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B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The research will endeavor to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the basic features of the information environment of 
Pakistan and where does it stand in comparison with other 
countries? 
2. How do terrorist organizations use the information environment to 
their advantage? 
3. How effective will it be to use the information environment to break 
the terrorist networks within Pakistan?  
4. What is the relationship between human and technical networks in 
Pakistan? 
5. How can the technology be managed to fight terrorism in Pakistan? 
C. METHODS AND RESOURCES 
The research employs the multiple comparative case study approach, 
evaluating the global information environment and that of other countries facing 
terrorism issues of the magnanimity of Pakistan. The Sri Lankan fight of terrorism 
against the LTTE/Tamil Tigers is one case that we studied in detail. For a 
futuristic overview, we also looked at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
focusing on its efforts to monitor and curb the spread of extremism in mainland 
U.S. The research about other countries was taken from existing case studies 
and official websites. The main focus of research remains on the use of the 
information environment by terrorists in Pakistan and its effectiveness, followed 
by how to break the terrorist network through information operations; we also 
made use of journal articles, official databases, research papers, reports, and 
other publications. 
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D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Our work begins with the importance of understanding the information 
environment around us. It makes analogies with other advancements in the 
scientific domains that have brought significant changes in the way we think and 
make our decisions. It discusses the role of information from ancient times 
through modern era and its role in various wars. Having looked at the information 
environment around us, the thesis focuses on the information environment of 
Pakistan in particular. Pakistan belongs to the developing world where keeping 
pace with technological advancements is considered more of a luxury than a 
necessity; there are basic needs of society that take precedence. The information 
domain has remained no different in this regard. The tyranny is that the forces of 
evil (terrorist) organizations in the north frontier part of Pakistan are not as 
ignorant of the information domain as they might be considered. This thesis 
discusses these exploitations by terrorist networks, and the counter tactics 
adopted by the modern world. The research work focuses on the counter-
terrorism methodology of Pakistan via the information domain, and identifies 
areas that need immediate revamping in terms of resources, organizational 
restructuring, and training. The thesis recommends some short-term and long-
term measures that would help Pakistan to not only break terrorist networks 
within the countries, but also to help control/monitor fundamentalism in the 
society. 
Chapter II explains the role of information environment in influencing a 
society. Basing on U.S. Joint Publication 3–13, this chapter builds the framework 
for our analysis of Pakistan information environment. Chapter III describes the 
evolution of terrorism and its root causes in Pakistan. It narrows down to 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is the main focus of our research. 
Organizational and operational structure of TTP is explained and analyzed in 
detail. In Chapter IV comparative study of Sri Lankan counter insurgency 
operation against LTTE and U.S. measures to counter terrorism inside the 
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country has been carried out. Inferences are drawn from these two models, to 
develop information environment based counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. 
Chapter V explains the exploitation of the information environment by terrorist 
organizations globally, in general and TTP in particular. Chapter VI concludes our 
analysis of information environment based counter terrorism strategy for 
Pakistan. We suggest some information environment related measures for 
incorporation in the overall strategy. 
 6 
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II. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
The phenomenon of globalization is largely attributed to advancements in 
communications and connectivity mediums. The wired and wireless means of 
communications provide opportunities, as well as vulnerabilities for the modern 
world. It is believed that the advancements in communication technology were 
necessitated due to the desire to transfer messages (information) at greater 
speeds. This fact alone conveys the importance of information and its 
dissemination to improve connectivity. Unfortunately, history has seen military 
campaigns as the breeding environment of technological advancements. Use of 
an informational advantage to one’s own benefit can be traced back to even 
Mongols who spread fear of their barbaric invasions among the tribes they were 
planning to invade. This way they would suppress their enemy psychologically 
even before physically fighting the war. Information operations have always been 
an important aspect of military planners.  
The U.S. Joint Publication on information operations defines information 
as a tool that can influence, usurp, disrupt, or corrupt an adversary’s decision-
making mechanism.2 It defines the information environment as “the aggregate of 
individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act 
on information.”3 The adversary can be not only an enemy fighting war, but also 
a business competitor, political party, or an opponent team in any sport. The 
information environment has been characterized into three dimensions that 
continuously interact with individuals, organizations and the systems (shown in 
Figure 1).  
                                            
2 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, November 
27, 2012, 14. 
3 Ibid., VII. 
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The physical dimension includes infrastructure that decision makers or 
policy makers use to create effects in information environment.4 This includes 
humans, newspapers, books, TV, microwave towers, radio broadcast stations, 
and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The information dimension is the actual 
place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and 
protected. The cognitive dimension is related to the minds of the people 
receiving, understanding, and disseminating information or taking action on the 
information. It is very important to understand this information environment, 
because information operations are conducted in this environment. Whenever we 
want to plan an information operation, we have to select a target audience, which 
can be an individual, a group, a network, or a nation. This target audience is 
influenced by studying its information environment and then selecting courses of 
action to influence the target audience to take decision of our choice.5 This tactic 
is useful in countering any adversary. Information operations take place in the 
information environment. 
                                            
4 Ibid., 15, pp 2. 
5 Ibid., I-1. 
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Figure 1.  The information environment6 
The information environment has been present and evolving all through 
societal advancements, but is more prevalent in the present information age. The 
problem; however, the information environment is vulnerable to exploitation by 
forces of good and evil alike. In this chapter, we relate a few examples in recent 
history and present time where individuals, organizations, and systems were 
exploited for the purpose of waging war or inciting social movement. It is 
pertinent to mention that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has seen the 
maximum exploitation in this domain by both sides (forces of free world and 
terrorists). 
A. PROPAGANDA IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
The origin of conflict can be frequently traced to false perception.  
–Burton 
‘Enemy’ is a strong word because it is associated with emotions like 
anger, hatred, frustration, envy, jealousy, fear, and distrust. The characterization 
of an individual or/and organization or/and system as enemy or hostile, may be 
termed as demonization, and is destined to be met with hate, violence, battle. 
                                            
6 Ibid., 15. 
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and war.7 Understanding the ‘enemy’ is perceiving the information environment in 
which the enemy exists. The most agonizing environment would be one where 
you cannot discriminate between your friend and foe. Propaganda is one such 
tool that aims to reduce this discrimination.  
According to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, propaganda consists of ideas 
or statements that are often false or exaggerated and are spread in order to help 
a cause to take root, a political leader to take power, and a government to serve 
its political will. In terms of communication, propaganda is used to effect an 
adversary’s decision-making capability by creating uncertainty in facts or false 
projection of truth. Today we understand propaganda much better in terms of the 
information environment, and thus call it ‘information war.’ Propaganda takes 
birth in the information domain of the environment. It affects the cognitive domain 
where decisions are made, while transmitting through the physical domain (TV, 
Internet, radio, and print media). It is principally based on the concept of “actions 
following perceptions.” Walter Lippmann8 is of the view that if we can sugar coat 
a lie in a way that it looks like the truth, and mediate the 
perception/misperception of individuals, group or like the community 
(organization or system), we can effectively change the biases of society, 
country, or nation. 
Clausewitz defined war as an act of violence to compel our opponent to 
fulfill our will.9 In today’s information age, we can use means other than violence 
to achieve the same. U.S. doctrine defines information warfare as collective use 
of PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic 
                                            
7 Marthe L. Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston, Introduction to 
Political Psychology, (Mahwah, New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2009), 
54. 
8 Walter Lippmann was an American writer, reporter, and political commentator famous for 
coining the term “Cold War” in his 1922 book Public Opinion. His book is also known for its critical 
assessment of functional democratic government and for irrational social perceptions that affect 
individual behaviors. The first chapter of his book “The World Outside and Pictures in Our Head” 
is read, even today, by people related to influence warfare. 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Rosalie West 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO) and related fields of these 
terms, to affect (influence) the enemy.10 This is what was known as “Political 
Warfare” during World War II. The United States Joint Chief of Staff in World War 
II defined psychological warfare more broadly stating, “Psychological warfare 
employs any weapon to influence the mind of the enemy.” The weapons are 
psychological only in the effect they produce and not because of the weapons 
themselves.11 Today, one’s credit is another’s discredit; therefore, information 
can be manipulated in either way to influence the society. In World War II 
‘Airborne Leaflet Propaganda’12 was used extensively by Allied forces to change 
the perceptions of German soldiers. For Allied Forces it was a positive use, 
whereas for Germany it was hostile use of propaganda.  
If we consider the society as a system, then the individuals are the 
elementary components of the society, which are loosely coupled, but in 
cohesive organizational structure existing in the society. In modern-day 
propaganda war (information war), the enemy tries to change the symbols’ of 
perception by affecting public opinion, which in turn affects the decision makers. 
It is the public opinion that makes one person a hero and the other a devil. The 
most interesting portrait of a symbol is that which arises spontaneously in a 
people’s mind (e.g., due to an act or incident that grips the minds of the 
people).13 An adversary, as an opportunity, can seize initiative on this belief. For 
example Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for 9/11; the very next moment, 
he became the most wanted person in the world. He became the number one 
enemy of the state and civilized society. Nobody cared or knew that he was a key 
ally in defeating communism in Afghanistan. This is the same Communism 
against which the U.S. fought a long war in Vietnam. The nuisance value gave 
                                            
10 Dorothy E. Denning, “Information Operation, and Terrorism,” Journal of Information 
Warfare (2004): 3. 
11 Robert H. Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma (McGill-
Queen’s Press-MQUP, 1988), 131. 
12 James Alexander Campbell Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to 
Brainwashing (Middlesex, England: Penguin books, 1963). 
13 Ibid. 
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him (the adversary) referent power14 to recruit lots of like-minded aides all around 
the world. This implies that when fear and hatred take complete dominance in the 
minds of public, it is then the public opinion of love and hatred is developed.15 
This aspect is very important to understand; it is the foremost strategy of today’s 
enemy (terrorists). They create an environment of fear in the society by 
conducting suicide or IEDs attacks and maligning the regular forces/institutions 
through propaganda.  
Since 2001, the world has seen an increase in warfare. Extensive military 
planning and decision making has gone toward countering the menace of 
terrorism. World coalitions have gathered to devise effective mechanisms to 
make this world a safer place. Although a lot of success has been achieved, 
pilferages and lapses in security can still be seen. In Afghanistan, more than 10 
years down the line into war, coalition forces are still fighting the strong narrative 
of the Taliban that “U.S. led forces are there to destroy Islam”.16 Incidents of Abu 
Ghareeb’s17 fratricide and burning of the holy Quran18 (however accidental it may 
be) were detrimental for U.S. credibility in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the 
enemy was quick in developing propaganda on such incidents because nobody 
could deny their reality. As time progresses, information (acquisition and 
dissemination) will continue to play a pivotal role in military decision making and 
planning.  
                                            
14 John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power (University of 
Michigan, 1959), 161. 
15 Ibid., 161. 
16 Fernando M. Lujan, “How to Get Afghans to Trust Us Once Again,” Washington Post, 
March 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-get-afghans-to-trust-us-once-
again/2012/03/01/gIQAfhZ9mR_story.html. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Kevin Sieff, “U.S. Probe of Koran Burning Finds 5 Troops Responsible,” Washington Post, 
March 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-probe-of-koran-burning-finds-5-soldiers-
responsible-afghan-clerics-demand-public-trial/2012/03/02/gIQAwJqYmR_story.html. 
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B.  WAR IN THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
War is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with 
other means. 
–Carl Von Clausewitz 
Historically, information, its availability and dissemination, has been an 
over-arching factor of military campaigns. Over the past few decades, the 
information boom has brought wars into the living rooms of common men. 
Actions of soldiers and decisions of commanders, in the field, have had direct 
implications on morale of public. The problem is multiplied, when the public sees 
these events through (suppose to be) the analytical eyes of a (trusted) media. 
The trustworthiness of the source, namely the anchor, the network, or the 
publisher, causes the audience to accept the story in its given format without 
questioning the motives that may have been behind its slant.19 Towing the same 
analogy of society as a ‘system,’ we think that media is aimed primarily toward 
the “individuals” aspect of the information environment. Individuals make public 
opinion and public opinion is very important for organizations representing the 
public. These public organizations are at the core of a true democratic system.  
Comparing the coverage of war and famine in Sudan with that in Somalia 
shows some of the factors in media gatekeeping,20 many of which have nothing 
to do with the event itself. Similar conditions existed at the same time in each 
country, but Somalia became the focus of media attention and from that, 
humanitarian aid. Sudan, on the other hand, had limited access to media, and so 
remained neglected from any international aid. Media has become a tool of 
foreign policy and world politics. Being at the forefront of global politics, the U.S. 
has a very prominent media role in influencing public opinion. In the U.S., media 
is closely linked to public opinion and public policy.21 Media attention to an issue 
                                            
19 Ibid. 
20 Theresa Bly, “Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. National Policy” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2002), 15. 
21 Ibid., 15. 
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affects decision making because policymakers understand that mass media 
shapes public opinion and they want public opinion on their side. The major 
concerns for U.S. media, in deciding whether to cover a certain event, are driven 
by factors like location and nationality of the victims, the foreign policy orientation 
of the U.S. government, and the accessibility of the affected areas to the press 
corps. In the case of Sudan and Somalia, the only difference was that coverage 
by the media was made easier by the logistics of operating in Somalia22 that is 
why it got more coverage than Sudan.  
Similarly, the media has a prominent role in spreading propaganda, with 
many examples where media campaigns were effectively used to spread 
propaganda. This aspect of media comes into play when the media portray a 
negative image of the enemy (Iraq weapons of mass destruction) and reinforces 
it with rhetoric in support of their own side (Al-Qaida getting hold of weapons of 
mass destruction from Iraq). This propaganda enables the decision makers (U.S. 
congress), to authorize military invasion with public support.  
This tool is a double-edged sword; the enemy can also utilize it in order to 
malign the friendly side. How it generally works is a simple media tactic that 
includes: using selective stories that are wide-covering and objective, 
presentations of partial facts, and offering judgments and conclusions without 
including the supporting evidence and chain of reasoning that led to them. What 
results is a shortcut in the reasoning process that removes the possibility of 
critical thought and analysis from the audience, and encourages them to accept 
the presented judgment as fact. This aspect needs to be guarded by state 
leaders, as taxpayers would fall prey to negative propaganda and may demand 
immediate actions by the government who can succumb to public pressure very 
easily (U.S., Vietnam, and Somalia withdrawal). The media are not alone in their 
manipulation of the facts. During time of war (and even during peace) the military 
                                            
22 Steven Livingston, “Suffering in Silence: Media Coverage of War and Famine in Sudan,” in 
Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises, ed. Robert I. Rotberg 
and Thomas G. Weiss (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 68. 
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operates in a similar fashion by restricting the information presented to the media 
and hence what the public is told.  
Recent events in the authoritarian Arab world termed as “Arab Springs” 
(Egypt, Libya) brought a new dimension of media into the limelight. Facebook 
and Twitter were thought of as tools of revolution in the Middle East. Following 
the Arab Spring the world began debating whether social media caused the 
social mobilization or simply helped in the communication process.23 Information 
travelling over the Internet has a peculiarity compared to information over other 
media. Internet users are mostly a literate part of the population. Therefore, the 
Internet may be more effective in the modern world than in countries which are 
still struggling with their literacy rates, where culturally orthodox means of 
communications are still prevalent. The Internet has not had huge impact on 
such societies.  
C. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT OF PAKISTAN 
When you give everyone a voice and give people power, the 
system usually ends up in a really good place. 
–Mark Zuckerberg 
Pakistan is part of the developing nations that are struggling to deal with 
poverty, illiteracy, health issues, political instability, and terrorism. The 
information environment of Pakistan is also defined by these struggling. The 
cognitive domain of the information environment in Pakistan is the mass of 
population, which is characterized by its social fabric defined earlier. To target 
such a weak or unstable society is very easy compared to a well-educated and 
stable society. In Pakistani society (rural population mainly), information flow is 
mostly through word-of-mouth, and the credibility of the source is not important; 
only the information is important. With the mushroom growth of TV and radio 
channels in Pakistan, this phenomenon has multiplied. Similarly, the physical 
                                            
23 Lilas N. Gawhry, “Assessing The Impact of Social Media on The 25 January 2011 
Egyptian Revolution” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 6. 
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domain of the information environment not only covers all the previously 
mentioned elements, but also elements like mosques, Madrassas, and religious 
gatherings, which take a major role in disseminating information in Pakistani 
society. The information domain is the actual message travelling back-and-forth 
in the society. Let us analyze the information environment of Pakistan in terms of 
Individuals, organizations and systems. 
1. Individuals 
Unlike in developed nations, in struggling societies like Pakistan 
personalities are more important than the media (e.g., ‘Mullah’ giving a fatwa in a 
remote village would be accepted immediately without realizing the context, 
authenticity, or credibility of the person). Similarly, a feudal lord or a 
‘Panchait’/’Jirga’ (group of tribal elders who act as a court) can decide the fate of 
a person without subjecting him to any law of the state. Politicians are accepted 
on the basis of their wealth, social strength in society, and cultural bondage, 
rather than their vision, political soundings, or welfare policies. Since people 
voting for political candidates are mostly illiterate, political campaigns are based 
on political gatherings of masses or political sermons (Jalsa), rather than modern 
information systems. In Pakistani society, individuals are mostly divided on the 
basis of two major affiliations: ethnicity and religious sect. This is why the political 
system of Pakistan is also based on these two major divides. The Mullah has a 
prominent role in politics, as does the feudal lord.   
Since our research focuses on religious terrorism in Pakistan, we 
elaborate here on how religiously-influenced information is transmitted into the 
community. The Mullah’s importance in society has emerged from the traditional 
role of mosques in a Muslim society. We lay emphasis on understanding the role 
of mosques in the information environment of Pakistan, because this is the 
elementary individual aspect of the environment and is probably a huge 
contributor in the spread of extremism and radicalized Islam in Pakistani society. 
Mosques were/are considered to be the hub of social activities in rural areas of 
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Pakistan (approximately 67 percent24). They provide an environment where 
people offer prayers together, interact socially, exchange views and news, 
conduct community meetings, decide important matters, and perform marriage 
rituals (Nikkah). Messages of funerals, lost and found, congregations, and other 
important messages are hailed form the mosque loudspeakers. In such a 
scenario, a person in charge of the mosque (Mullah) is kept in high esteem. He is 
considered more pious and his opinion definitely matters. He is supposedly 
educated in a Madrassas, where he learned the Quran by heart (Hafiz). Rarely 
would he be a graduate of a recognized and reputable Madrassa where complete 
Islamic scholarship is taught. This linkage of the mullah with a Madrassa is also 
very important to understand for the purpose of our research regarding the 
information environment of Pakistan. 
The Madrassa has a prominent role in the literary heritage of the Muslim 
world. Any center of education imparting religious and scientific, social education 
is called as a Madrassa. Unfortunately, in Pakistani society it is linked with a 
place where only religious education is imparted. There are many Madrassas in 
Pakistan that are centers of excellence for true religious education, as well as 
producing religious scholars of international levels. Many of those are run as an 
extension to mosques where orphan and poor children are given free Quranic 
education. These Madrassas are generally run on donations from the community, 
where the mullah of the mosque is in charge of the Madrassa; making him an 
absolute authority in Islamic reference for that community. 
To understand the Pakistani information environment, we must statistically 
evaluate other physical domain tools available in the Pakistani environment. 
Currently in Pakistan, 20 million (out of 180 million) people use the Internet. That 
figure amounts to only slightly over 10 percent of the population. In 2007, the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ranked Pakistan’s position 127 out 
                                            
24 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Area, Population, Density and Urban/Rural Proportion 




of 159 countries in terms of access to online communication, use, and skills. At 
that time, the Internet growth rate for Pakistan was higher than for any other 
country because the ICT usage in the country was barely existent at the time of 
previous evaluation in 2002. However, the growth slowed substantially in 2008, 
with the country’s position ranking 128.25 This was due to insufficient 
development and quality of the network, and of course by low levels of education. 
The Internet is still accessed mainly through dial-up connections, and only about 
1.3 million people use broadband connections in Pakistan.26  
These statistics suggest that Internet and social media have not yet been 
acknowledged as a means of communication by most of Pakistani society; the 
major reason being the illiteracy and vast disparity in the urban and rural 
population. According to Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), 67 percent of the 
population is rural.27 The rural area of the population lacks even the necessities 
of life, like food, shelter, medicine, and hygiene. In this condition, to expect that 
this population would be conversant with use of mobile Internet, social media or 
other ‘E-Contents’ would definitely be out of context. Surprisingly, though, 
broadcast media, particularly TV, stands out in this denomination. TV serves as 
the source of news and information more than newspapers or radios in Pakistan. 
Rural areas are also finding TV overwhelmingly more popular than radio and 
newspaper. At this point, we can infer that at the individual level of the 
information environment for a typical Pakistani community, the Mullah is still a 
more effective tool to affect public opinion (cognitive domain) through his mosque 
                                            
25 The ICT Development Index (IDI) is composed of three sub-indexes measuring access 
(fixed telephony, mobile telephony, international Internet bandwidth, households with computers 
and households with Internet), use and intensity of use (Internet users, fixed broadband and 
mobile broadband) and skills (adult literacy rate, gross secondary and tertiary enrollment). 
26 Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Telecom indicators (Government of Pakistan, 
2014), http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=269:telecom 
indicators&catid=124:in dustry-report&Itemid=599. The development and communication 
statistics for Pakistan and other selected countries are given in Appendix A. 
27 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Area, Population, Density and Urban/Rural Proportion 




(physical domain) by disseminating radicalized/neutral messages (information 
domain), rather than using other modern day tools like the radio, TV, or Internet. 
2. Organizations 
Individuals make organizations which play an important role in affecting 
integration of the society. In the Pakistani environment, organizations that matter 
in the society, or which have pronounced affect in shaping public opinion of the 
society, are again based on political or religious affiliations. Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) are mostly foreign funded and therefore have very little 
credibility due to skepticism about their role in Pakistani society.28 Taking a dip 
into the religion-based organizations, these organizations lie at the very core of 
Pakistan’s civil society. Since Pakistan was founded on the premise of religion, 
religious parties enjoy overarching impact in the social sector. The relationship 
between the state and religious organization has remained cordial ever since 
Pakistan’s inception in 1947.29 The political legitimacy of religious organizations 
has been manipulated by the political parties for public support and to counter 
the authoritarian military rule in most of Pakistan’s history.30 Therefore, the 
political organizational setup has been responsible, directly or indirectly, in 
spreading the agenda of religious organizations. This may be the single most 
important reason that has prevented the state from fully functioning as a true 
democracy. Religious organizations have been involved in policy formulations 
and lawmaking in the parliament and have also had a chance to form the 
government in one of the province during recent past.31 With such greater impact 
of religion in the society, it is very difficult to denounce religious beliefs and to 
counter the narrative of radicalized religious belief. Pakistan is peculiar in this 
                                            
28 “Role of NGOs in Pakistan,” August 6, 2014, http://theroleofngosinpakistan.blogspot.com. 
29 Nida Kirmani, “Interactions between Religion, the State and Civil Society in Pakistan: 
Some Implications for Development,” Lahore University of Management Sciences, 2011, 
http://lums.edu.pk/docs/dprc/Interactions-between-Religion--the-State-and-Civil-Society-in-
Pakistan-Nida-Kirmani.pdf. 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of religious political parties, remained in power 
from 2002–2007 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.  
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respect because elsewhere religious organizations have not been given such 
greater political voice. Almost 25 Islamic political parties take part in the electoral 
process directly or indirectly.32 Although they have not enjoyed overwhelming 
support of the public, their participation in the political process has prevented the 
state from developing into a true secular democracy. All these faith-based 
organizations are a product of the Madrassa and mosque culture of Pakistani 
society. Their leaders or governing bodies are mostly individuals that have been 
educated in the same Madrassa systems where the modern world today finds 
roots of radicalized Islam and fundamentalism and eventually terrorism.33 
3. System 
Having discussed the individual and organizational level of information 
environment of Pakistan, we will now analyze the civil society of the country as a 
‘system of systems.’ In Pakistan the term ‘civil society’ is used as a generic term 
including citizen organizations and initiatives, networks and alliances working in 
the context of social, and economic, religious, and cultural fields.34 These could 
be formal or informal. The formal category includes political parties, non-
governmental organizations, trade unions, professional associations, 
philanthropies, academia, pressure groups, and think tanks. The informal 
category includes faith-based organizations, burial societies, shrines, seminaries, 
neighborhood associations, jirgas (councils of elders), and savings groups. In the 
last 10–15 years, the information environment of Pakistan has affected civil 
society in many ways. The media boom has transformed the way people think 
and behave, which in turn has changed the way the organizations act/react to 
different scenarios. In addition, social media have also had deep-rooted impacts 
on the civil society as illustrated by the lawyers’ movement for restoration of 
                                            
32 Robert Boggs, “Pakistan’s Pashtun Challenge: Moving from Confrontation to Integration,” 
Strategic Analysis 36, no. 2 (2012): 206–216. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Saeed Saqib, Rohde Markus, and Wulf Volker, “ICTS, an Alternative Sphere for Social 
Movements in Pakistan: a Research Framework,” (Department of Information Systems and New 
Media University of Siegen, Germany). 
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Chief Justice of Pakistan. The peculiarity of the information environment of 
Pakistan remains as these mobilizations (carrying political aspects too) are 
mainly orchestrated by civil society because people have very limited access to 
the information technology services.35 As discussed earlier, TV and radio have 
taken prominence in Pakistan, so a lot of emphasis is being put on information 
dissemination through these media. However, their use is still limited due to lack 
of social amenities like electricity in the rural areas across the country. Therefore, 
civil society still relies on culturally influenced and non-modernized means of 
information dissemination. 
 
Figure 2.  Factors contributing to information environment of Pakistan 
                                            
35 Ibid., 1–4. 
 22 
For the purpose of this research, since we divided the populace into 
political and religious attributes at the individual and organizational level, we 
discuss the political system of Pakistan in relation to the information environment. 
Islam has become an important aspect of the political system of Pakistan. It is 
pertinent to understand how information flows in this system for the purpose of 
influence and decision-making. For that, it is important to analyze how religious 
parties affect or influence the decision making process of the state. These 
parties’ ability to demonstrate support for their various agendas is a testament of 
coherent internal structure, policymaking processes, and relations between the 
leadership and the rank-and-file. These aspects of party functioning are, 
therefore, as critical to understanding their role in the polity and prospects of 
influencing policy in the future as in understanding their relationship to the 
state.36 Close analysis reveals that they are not dependent on any modern day 
information systems for establishing communication within their ranks. Use of 
social media, Internet, and TV channels is very limited. However, use of radio, 
and extensive use of DVD/CDs is a recurring phenomenon. The main reason is 
to counter the limitation of literacy among the followers. An illiterate person can 
listen and follow better than read and follow. That said, there has been evidence 
of extremists in Pakistan trying to attract other media through violent acts for the 
projections of their militant activities. The recruitment centers and political 
support of religious parties still originates from Madrassas and traditional ways of 
communication through mosques and door-to-door preaching. Recently, online 
mediums and social media have been successful in Pakistani society (e.g., in the 
‘lawyers’ movement in 2007, protests against controversial cartoon drawings of 
Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him), and the humanitarian social movement during 
                                            
36 Ibid., 1. 
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floods in 2010). However, the loss of Pakistan-Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)37 in recent 
elections (which dominated social media) is another proof of our assertions that 
social media does not reach a majority of the population in Pakistan. 
Pakistani media has a vibrant landscape that enjoys relatively more 
freedom as compared to other nations of Southeast Asia.38 More than 40 
television channels show a host of programs of common interest. Radio channels 
are numerous and considered primary sources of information for the rural 
areas.39 Media demographics reflect a multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic, stratified 
class society, which shows a clear divide between Urdu and English media. The 
political system of Pakistan has transformed completely in the last 10–15 years 
due to this vibrant media. Culturally influenced methods of communication, 
though dominant up till now, will surely see transformation too. Social media 
have shown effects, and with a rise in the literacy rate of the society, will have an 
exponential influence in the society.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Information can be used to as a tool to influence, usurp, disrupt, or 
corrupt adversary’s decision-making mechanism. 
2. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, and systems; it is exploited by friend and foe alike. 
3. Propaganda is developed in the information domain of the 
information environment, which uses physical domain tools like TV, 
radio, print, and electronic media, and some orthodox means to 
affect the cognitive domain (which may be public opinion). 
                                            
37 PTI is considered the third political force in Pakistani that is based on mainly youth 
membership. It enjoys lot of control over social Media and modern means of communication. 
Before the recent elections in May 2013, it was believed that PTI may have gained Political 
influence to defeat the contemporary political opponents. Although it did mange to gather second 
largest vote counts but could not gather rural votes that accounted for more than 60% of the 
seats in central legislature. 
38 Munawar Sabir, “The Role of Media in Creating Values of Nationalism in Pakistan,” 
Journal of Political Studies, Vol.18, no. 2 (2011): 22, 
http://results.pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Nationalism%20-%202.pdf.  
39 Ibid., 22. 
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4. Social media have a far reaching impact on social movements, but 
their use is limited to societies that are Internet savvy, have higher 
literacy rates and have better social-economic conditions. 
5. The Pakistani information environment is characterized by Mullah, 
mosque and Madrassa at the individual level. At the organizational 
level, it has a religion based organization (political and non-
political), whereas at system level, the role of religious parties in 
political system of Pakistan provides legitimacy to militancy in the 
name if Islam. 
6. Mosques and Madrassas are at the elementary level of the 
information environment of Pakistan that resonate extremism and 
fundamentalism in the society.  
7. The information environment of Pakistan is based on culture, rather 
than on technology. 
8. The Pakistani information environment is dominated by culturally 
influenced methods of communication, including word of mouth, 
TV, and radio. 
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III. TERRORISM STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN 
This chapter covers the reasons for the rise of extremism in Pakistani 
society, the contribution of government policies, and the effect of regional 
powers. Various terrorist organizations in Pakistan and their connections will be 
covered with focus on their communication architecture. Considering the current 
ideology of world terrorist organizations, followers of that ideology in Pakistan, 
connection with world terrorist organizations; Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
was identified as most active by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.40 TTP conducted 103 attacks inflicting 
510 deaths and more than 900 injuries in 2012 (only in Pakistan). The group 
claimed responsibility for 70 percent of these attacks, typically via telephone 
following the incidents.41 This chapter will be limited to TTP, considering it is the 
most dangerous terrorist organization in Pakistan. It is considered that this 
network gives oxygen to the other smaller terrorist networks for their activities 
and survival. The chapter is laid out as per the framework of information 
environment set for this thesis work; following systems, organizations, and 
individuals. 
A. BACKGROUND AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TOWARD 
TERRORISM 
Since its independence, Pakistan has faced an abnormal atmosphere in 
domestic and international politics since. The hostility of neighboring states, weak 
economic conditions, refugee influx and their settlements, confounding foreign 
relations and military intervention in running state affairs, have made the situation 
even worse. Corruption was adopted as a culture at all levels of national and 
domestic affairs. Democratically elected politicians, once at the helm of affairs, 
                                            
40 U.S. Department of State, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information, U.S. Department of State Statistical Analysis 
(2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/210017.htm. 
41 Ibid., 5. 
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established organizations to terrorize political opponents (Prime Minister Z.A. 
Bhutto created the ‘Federal Security Force’ to target political opponents).42 
Likewise, at ground level, police and other state power-holders were used by 
political representatives to suppress the weak and deviant. Most of the people 
lost trust in the system, law enforcement agencies, the judicial system, and the 
security situation. In such turmoil, the only source of respite people sought was in 
religion. The political corruption created a vacuum which was filled through 
religious political parties. Lewis Fry Richardson stated in his analysis about 
religion: 
The one social factor that does have some detectable correlation 
with war is religion.43 
The extremist views took hold in Pakistan, with support from the first 
Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The war attracted numerous fighters from 
all over the world to the area in the name of Jihad. Those who wanted to fight 
Soviets were supported by Pakistan, CIA and other western intelligence 
agencies. That was the time when Madrassa (religious school) culture took hold 
in Pakistan. Most of the people in Pakistan cannot afford education and people 
living in remote areas are very conveniently used by clerics to run Madrassas. 
These self-sustained (based on donations and good will of local populace) 
institutions provide ‘environment’ in which extremist sentiments flourish. The 
Madrassas became breeding places of fighters, who were taught Jihad as it 
would suit the purpose of fighting Soviets. Between 1979 and 2003, the number 
of Madrassas increased from 1,745 to somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000.44 
Religion was given importance to make Jihadists who also supported freedom 
fighters in Kashmir who were (and still are) very dear and near to Pakistani 
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nation. At the end of Afghan war, most of the fighters in Afghanistan were not 
disarmed and they continued to participate in the Afghan civil war. The foreign 
fighters were not trusted or accepted/welcomed by their native countries, and 
they chose to stay in Afghanistan after the war. The northwestern tribal belt45 of 
Pakistan (FATA—Federally Administrated Tribal Areas) provided a porous and 
unchecked border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There the system of 
government also suited fighters to move freely between the two countries. The 
Islamic revolution in Iran also played its role and supported religious radicalism in 
Pakistan. The difference in practicing of religion between Shia and Sunni factions 
became a source of sectarian killings/terrorism in Pakistan.  
Media sensation and publicity enhanced the effects of terrorism in 
Pakistani society by giving undue coverage to each and every act of terrorism. 
Eric Hobsbawn in his book “Globalization, Democracy, and Terrorism” suggests 
that terrorism could be controlled, if it did not provide the publicity oxygen.”46 The 
government of Pakistan could not implement long term and sustained policies on 
many issues and in many critical situations. The inconsistent policies discredited 
the government. The most important example is of Afghan Jihad, where support 
of the Taliban took a U-turn after 9/11. Confused economic policies and 
mishandling of mineral wealth of Baluchistan also became sources of uneasiness 
for Balochs resulting in terrorist attacks on government installations. Taking 
advantage of such an environment, foreign elements found opportunity to use it 
to their advantage and fuel terrorist activities to destabilize Pakistan. Foremost 
among them is the Pakistan’s eastern neighbor, which is funding the terrorist 
networks in Pakistan.47 
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“Economic development is a more important factor to maintain law and 
order.”48 Social deprivations, poverty, illiteracy, lack of economic opportunities, 
and terrorism itself resulted in producing more distress and more poverty. 
Poverty and economic differences (especially in the tribal belt of FATA) created 
disturbance in the minds of the deprived. The poor felt insecure and could be 
bought easily. All this influenced the people to mistrust government and society, 
and to fight for their rights in desperation. 
B. SYSTEM OF TERRORIST NETWORKS IN PAKISTAN 
Terrorist organizations of Pakistan aim to transform the civil society 
according to their own agendas. We can also look at terrorism as a system that is 
affiliated with the global system of terrorism (system-of-systems). For a better 
description, the terrorist system in Pakistan is classified into three broad 
categories: (a) religion based, (b) sectarian based, and (c) ethnicity based. 
Profiles of terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan are provided in Appendix 
D. Some political parties also use terrorist organizations for gaining street power 
and influencing sympathizers of some faction and increasing their vote bank 
during elections. The population of Pakistan is about 75 percent of Sunni and 20 
percent are Shia.49  
Based on the links with world terrorist organizations, lethality in approach, 
number of terrorist attacks, and the effects achieved from these attacks and 
casualties, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) appears to be the most lethal in 
Pakistan. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan were attributed to 18 different perpetrator 
organizations in 2012; however, Pakistan also had a particularly high percentage 
of attacks with unidentified perpetrators (82.5 percent) compared to the global 
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average of unattributed attacks (61.7 percent).50 Terrorist organizations in 
Pakistan are quite open to accept responsibility of their acts of terrorism. 
C. TAHREEK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)—ANALYSIS 
We will focus on TTP analysis both as an organization and as a system 
that supports other organizations, gains strength, and works as an umbrella for 
them. Before describing the systems part of TTP, we will provide the 
organizational setup of TTP, its roots, objective, narrative, and internal 
differences. 
After 9/11, a section of radicals started a movement inside Pakistan to 
support the Afghan Taliban. Small militant groups operating independently 
started networking with one another during the period 2002–2004. The Afghan 
Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership, along with Arab, Chechen, Uzbek, East Asian, 
and Sudanese fighters, crossed over the Pak-Afghan border to take shelter in the 
northwestern tribal belt of Pakistan. Al Qaeda militants distributed millions of 
dollars among tribal elders in return for shelter.51 Many local extremist groups, 
which were banned in Pakistan, started joining the Taliban ranks in FATA, some 
as followers, others as partners. The Pakistan Army, amid international pressure, 
entered tribal areas to hunt for Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders, which 
resulted into a full-blown insurgency and terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. In 
December 2007, the existence of the TTP was officially announced under the 
leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.52 TTP and Afghan Talibans both share Deobandi 
interpretation of Islam and are predominantly Pashtuns.53 In August 2008, the 
government banned the group, and froze its bank accounts and assets. In 2009, 
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the leader of TTP Baitullah Mehsud was killed in an attack and Hakimullah 
Mehsud took over the leadership of the terrorist network. Hakimullah Mehsud 
maintained the tempo of terrorist acts, but was killed in a U.S. drone attack in 
November 2013.54 The same month TTP shura (consultation/decision-making 
body) chose their new emir/leader, Mullah Fazlullah.  
Inside Pakistan, the TTP has performed as a loose organizational system. 
However, the leadership keeps a keen eye on associates, and ensures that the 
central cause is followed and leadership authority is maintained as terrorist acts 
are claimed by the central Shura. Outside Pakistan, TTP claimed responsibility 
for the December 2009 suicide attack on CIA facilities in Camp Chapman in 
Afghanistan, and the attempted bombing in Times Square in May 2010.55  
1. TTP Objectives 
Since its establishment, the TTP through its various demarches has 
announced the following objectives and principles: 
 Enforce Sharia, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and 
perform “defensive Jihad against the Pakistan Army.”56 
 React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District 
and North Waziristan Agency.57 
 Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA 
area and withdrawal of the Army.58 
 Demand the release of imprisoned members of TTP and Taliban. 
Figure 3 displays the key leaders of TTP.59 
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Figure 3.  Key TTP leaders 
2. Salience of  Senior TTP Leader’s Personality 
Before describing TTP as a system, it would be appropriate to talk about 
the key individuals who affect/influence TTP as a system. Moreover, to counter 
any ideology/network. it is important to understand the character of the group’s 
decision makers. The founder of TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, did not attend school. 
He shunned media and refused to be photographed, indicating that he stood by 
the fanatic Talibanized version of Islam. The next TTP emir, Hakimullah Mehsud, 
was also a dropout from a small village Madrassa in the Hangu district. Unlike his 
predecessor, Hakimullah posed for photographs and recognized the value of 
media as a propaganda tool.  
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The current emir of TTP, Fazlullah, received his initial education from a 
religious seminary of Sufi Muhammad in Malakand (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province of Pakistan). He married Sufi Muhammad’s daughter and joined Tehrik 
Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) organized by his father-in-law. Later, he 
went to fight NATO and the U.S. from the platform of the Afghan Taliban. In 
2001, Sufi Muhammad was arrested by Pakistani security agencies, which 
created a vacuum in the TNSM leadership. Fazlullah felt the need to fill up the 
vacuum and started preaching in a small mosque in the Swat. Over a period of 
time, his sermons in the mosque became furious. He launched an unauthorized 
FM radio channel in 2004, through which he preached anti-Americanism and 
righteous actions of Taliban to fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He discouraged 
girls’ education and preached against watching television and listening to music. 
He formed armed groups, which patrolled Swat valley, ensured that people 
obeyed his version of Islam, and terrorized people by killing opponents. He went 
into two peace agreements with the Pakistani government; both ended in military 
operations. The last operation (Operation Rah-e-Raast) in May 2009 cleared the 
valley from Fazlullah and his staunch followers. Fazlullah fled from the area and 
took refuge in Afghanistan. Since 2009, Fazlullah has been hiding in the Afghan 
provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, and orchestrating attacks in Pakistan from 
across the border.60 Mullah Fazlullah is also known as ‘Mullah Radio’ or ‘Mullah 
FM’ due to his excessive use of radio broadcasts. He also claimed the 
responsibility of attacking Malala Yousafzai (a Pakistani girl working for female 
education).  
3. Narrative of TTP 
TTP has very affectively identified the weakness of its target audience. 
The narrative of TTP was built in the prevalent information environment of 
Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban recruits young men by offering them access to, 
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and membership in, social networks, as well as money, power, and respect.61 
Most of the recruits are young unemployed men from under-developed areas. 
TTP provides them a sense of belonging to a peer group. Identity / group identity 
is provided to fill up the vacuum which these people have. “The lone-wolves are 
approached and connected with social community,” as Helfstein states,62 for 
achievement of common goals. They are radicalized during interactions and 
convinced to volunteer. Poor economic condition of society (especially in tribal 
areas), lack of infrastructural development, illiteracy, and social injustice are 
major factors that aid recruitment efforts.63 TTP pays salaries ranging from $180 
to $240 a month.64 Militants also take advantage of the internal displacement 
caused by military operations and the inability of the government to provide 
decent living conditions. Due to frustration over government’s failure in these 
camps, people living as IDPs (Internally Displaced Personnel) reportedly join 
TTP as a reaction to the deaths of lost family members (even those who died 
because of pneumonia/diarrhea). TTP also wins hearts and minds of locals by 
providing free and swift justice, and law and order via their dispute-resolution 
centers and Sharia courts.65 Coercive tactics are also used to recruit fighters or 
suppress dissent.66 In early 2007, terrorists began forcing schoolchildren to sign 
up for suicide bombing missions in one part of the Tank District of Pakistan, and 
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abducted 30 children for this purpose.67 In Swat, the rebels forced the locals to 
show their support by either supporting the regime monetarily or sending a family 
member to join them. Those who refused to comply were threatened with eviction 
or were chased out. TTP militants killed tribal elders and warned others against 
supporting the government or organizing against them.68 The drone attacks 
conducted by the U.S. also added fuel to the fire and made the tasks of the 
terrorists easier to produce avengers for the killings and deprivations of their 
loved ones.69 According to the New American Foundation, the 158 drone strikes 
launched during 2004–2010 have caused anywhere from 311 to 530 civilian 
casualties.70 Such strikes only help the insurgents recruit more fighters. Baitullah 
Mehsud once succinctly underscored this idea by remarking:- 
I spent three months trying to recruit and got only 10–15 people. 
One U.S. attack and I got 150 volunteers!71 
4. Affiliations and Sources of Strength 
TTP maintains itself as a system by keeping itself attached with external 
powers and by sheltering most of the terrorist organization inside Pakistan. 
Overall, the system balances itself; if one approach is dull, the focus shifts to 
another, whether it be internal or external affiliation in terms of finances, ideology, 
or material support.  
a. External Affiliations 
The external affiliations of TTP can be broken down into three sections: 
the influence of intelligence agencies, the ideological influence from the Deoband 
                                            
67 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Troubled Frontier, ed. Shehzad H. Qazi, (Washington, 2009), 
131‒174. 
68 Tayyab A Shah, “Taliban Exploit Shi’a-Sunni Divide,” Terrorism Monitor 15 (2010). 
69 Ali Jafar Bukhari, “Cause of Terrorism in Pakistan,” PakPolice Magazine (March 30, 2012). 
http://www.pakpolicemag.com/articles/causes-of-terrorism-in-pakistan/. 
70 Shehzad H. Qazi, “An Extended Profile of the Pakistan Taliban,” Institute of Social Policy 
and Understanding (2011): 44. 
71 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place,” (North West Washington, DC: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2009), 18. 
 35 
movement in Pakistan, and the influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al 
Qaeda.72 Former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Rehman Malik, stated that India 
was behind most of the terror attacks in Pakistan.73 The involvement of the 
Afghan intelligence agency/government has also discussed giving directions and 
shelter to TTP leaders.74 Regarding the second factor of external influence, TTP 
follows the Deoband faction of Islam, draws moral strength from it and gets 
recruits from Deobandi Madrassas. TTP declares Mullah Omar (head of Afghan 
Taliban) as its supreme leader and Al-Qaeda’s head Osama Bin Ladin (killed in 
Abbottabad Pakistan) as a role model.75 It follows the footsteps of the Afghan 
Taliban and wants to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. According to the 
White House counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan, “the TTP has been 
training with, operating with, and planning attacks with Al Qaida.”76 In a press 
statement of September 1, 2010, U.S. State Department stated, “TTP and Al 
Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship; TTP draws ideological guidance from Al 
Qaeda, while Al Qaeda relies on the TTP safe havens in the Pashtun areas 
along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to 
both the Al Qaeda global terrorist network and the operational experience of its 
members.”77 If seen in the framework given by Malcolm Gladwell in his book ‘The 
Tipping Point,’78 Al Qaeda appears to be a Maven (source of knowledge) and the 
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terrorist groups like TTP are the Connectors, who join followers with the cause 
and take them along on the path of terrorism. 
b. Financial Support 
In addition to the support from external intelligence agencies and terrorist 
organizations discussed above, which forms the major component, TTP also 
raises money from donations, drug trade, kidnapping for ransom, protection 
rackets, and extortion. Regarding kidnapping for ransom, a government adviser 
in Sindh Province stated that the Taliban ask for the ransom money in foreign 
currency. In October 2008, Satish Anand, a filmmaker, was kidnapped from 
Karachi. He was released in Miran Shah area of North Waziristan Agency 
(FATA) after payment of approximately $169,000 (against the initial ransom 
demand of $530,000.33).79 In 2011, Riaz Chinoy, an industrialist, was kidnapped 
for a ransom demand of $740,000 (released after payment of approximately 
$211,000). A Taliban member, who claimed to be in the group’s finance 
department, said ‘donations’ amounting to $80,000 per month are collected in the 
Karachi area; these are supposedly protection money to prevent Taliban attacks. 
Truck drivers, who transport NATO supplies to Afghanistan from Karachi, 
regularly pay protection money to the Taliban to prevent attacks on their convoys 
or families.80 
c. Political Affiliations and Support  
A few political parties in Pakistan still support TTP for their vested 
interests. Such parties not only include the religious parties like Jamiat Ulema-e-
Islam (JUI-F) and Jamat-e-Islami, but the main stream political parties with partial 
support of some faction of TTP (Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz group 
patronage of TTP affiliates). The support is at times in the shape of opposing 
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strict measures against them (Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf) or keeping a soft corner 
to keep their vote bank healthy. JUI-F and Jamat-e-Islami leaders were involved 
in negotiations with the government (from the TTP side), held from March to June 
this year. JUI-F chief has always been a key mediator between TTP and the 
government. He played an important role in freeing government employees and 
others kidnapped by TTP in the Doaba area of the Kohat District in 2009.81 
Jamat-e-Islami’s former chief declared Hakimullah Mehsud a martyr once the 
TTP emir was killed in a drone attack. Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (the party 
in government), had a seat adjustment during elections with Ahle Sunnat Wal 
Jamaat (ASWJ), former Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), an affiliate of the TTP, during 
last provincial elections in Punjab.82 TTP affiliations in terms of militant 
organizations include the groups that used to operate against India and sectarian 
targets; Lahskar-e-Zil, 313 Brigade, Lahkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, 
Tehreek-e-Islami, Islami Taliban, Jaish-e-Islami and Al Hizb. Differences have 
also been observed with a few militant organizations like Jaish-e-Muhammed, 
Harkatul Mujahideen, Jamiatul Mujahdeen and Lashkar-e-Taiyba, mainly for their 
pro-government stance.83  
5. Internal Differences of the TTP 
Within the TTP, there are differences between Salafists and Deobandis. 
The Salafist members of the TTP practice a harsher interpretation of Islam and 
consider the Shia infidels. On the other hand, Deobandi followers are more 
flexible in comparison, and generally do not support killing Shia unless they 
themselves are attacked by them.84 During the time of former TTP commander 
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Hakimullah Mehsud, differences were observed between him and Waliur 
Rehman, who also influenced a portion of TTP followers. After the death of 
Hakimullah Mehsud, differences arose during the selection of a new emir of TTP. 
Khalid Mehsud (known as Khan Said Sajna, and a follower of Waliur Rehman) 
was expected to become the new emir as he belonged to the dominating Mehsud 
tribe. However, the leadership was handed over to Mullah Fazlullah (a non-
Mehsud) who hailed from Swat. Though Fazlullah’s appointment was expected, 
analysts and locals from Waziristan believed his status as a non-Mehsud TTP 
leader and his living across the border in Afghanistan would neutralize his 
strategic skills and vast fighting experience, and that some Mehsud Taliban 
leader could challenge him and cause cracks in the umbrella organization in the 
future.85 Sajna’s men did not accept a non-Mehsud as the new emir, while 
Sheheryar Mehsud (the other key leader supporting Fazllulah) and his followers 
defended the decision of Shura and accepted Fazllulah as new emir. The Sajna 
group represented TTP leader Waliur Rehman (killed in drone strike), and 
Shehryar Mehsud followed Hakeemullah Mehsud. The actual fight between the 
two groups started due to differences in talks with the government (initiated by 
the current government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif). The split seems more 
on a tribal basis than any religious or ideological difference. A senior TTP 
commander said Fazlullah can influence the Taliban in Afghanistan, but not in 
the tribal parts of the country. This vacuum of strong central leadership has 
caused split in TTP, and this is the reason that Taliban commanders stick to their 
tribal identity rather than their religious affiliation.86 Afghan Taliban tried to 
mediate peace between both factions of TTP, but fighting continued and during 
the last couple of months (before the military operation in North Waziristan 
Agency began) many key commanders were among 40–6087 Talibans killed due 
to infighting of TTP factions.  
                                            
85 Sherinzada, “Profile: From Mullah Radio to TTP Supremo,” Express Tribune, November 8, 
2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/628975/profile-from-mullah-radio-to-ttp-supremo/. 
86 Manish Rai, “TTP A Divided And Falling House,” The Daily Afghanistan, May 8, 2014. 
87 Ibid. 
 39 
6. TTP Relations with Other Tribes in FATA 
Until recently, the core strength of TTP drived from the Mehsud tribe; 
although the dynamics are changing with Fazullah’s taking over as emir of TTP 
(discussed above). Within the Mehsud tribe, Qari Zainuddin/Misbahuddin 
Mehsud lead some factions that opposed the TTP.88 TTP’s relationship has 
varied with Ahmedzai Wazirs, which is another important tribe of South 
Waziristan Agency. The tribe has supported as well as opposed TTP on different 
occasions.89 The Bhittani tribe from the South Waziristan Agency has also 
opposed TTP, primarily because of its history of bloody feuds with the Mehsud 
tribe.90 
7. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan—Analysis as a System under Trust 
and Influence Models 
Trust is a word that has four elements: a truster, a trustee, expectations, 
and context. It is the most important binding force in any system or network. Dark 
networks especially need trusted relations for their existence. Understanding 
‘trust,’ further reveals that people establish trusted relations in times of distress, 
crisis, risk, and uncertainty. Regarding the TTP, we need to understand that post 
9/11, the Afghan situation created an environment in the tribal belt/northwestern 
region of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan, which saw mushroom growth of 
radicalized organizations trying to be part of the global system of Jihad with the 
Afghan Taliban. The legitimacy of these organizations was built on a single point 
agenda, ‘Trust in Religion’ (radicalized version presented by clerics). Therefore, 
we can infer that in this model, ‘trusters’ were the Islamic radicalized elements of 
population, ‘trustee’ were the Madrassas (their Imams), ‘expectations’ were to be 
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part of noble cause as Allah wills with Pakistan withdrawing from the coalition of 
U.S., and the ‘context’ was the post 9/11 situation. 
A trusted network system exercises social power derived out of its 
linkages and cause. The elements of social power are quite complex and have 
been described by many different sociological and psychological theorists. The 
terms influence, power, decision making, and authority have been used 
interchangeably.91 French and Raven define social power as the “potential 
influence of one person over another.”92 Cartwright notes that two factors 
determine A’s power over B; (a) resources of A and (b) motive base of B.93 
French and Raven have classified social power as reward power, coercive 
power, legitimate power, referent power and expert power.94 To counter a 
network system, it is prudent to understand its social power dynamics. This is 
important because terrorist network system (like TTP) take their strength from 
society, which is their best breeding place. French and Raven are of the view that 
reward power and coercive power are related. Both involve A’s ability to 
manipulate the attainment of valences.95 The extent of power is directly related to 
the magnitude of reward or coercion. Here trust may be considered as a belief of 
B that A possesses such ability; thus, B’s behavior gets influenced by mere 
presence of A in the environment. We observe that TTP relies mostly on coercive 
power. The beheadings of people and security personnel in public, makes them 
powerful in the society. There have been incidences where TTP even executed 
(believe to be) informants in public to exemplify punishment for traitors. 
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Therefore, to diffuse coercive power we need to inculcate a sense of security and 
trust in the system. 
Legitimate power96 is probably the most complex form of power addressed 
by French and Raven in their “Bases of Social Power” model. As it stems from a 
variety of prescribed social relationships; trust may not be important it is with 
other forms of power. French and Raven denote it with behavioral expressions 
like “should,” “ought to,” or “has right to,” which obviates any notion of trust or 
expectations, or at least makes your think about your obligation rather than 
expectations. Therefore, we can safely imply that trust (under the prism of 
legitimacy) may be necessary for smooth working, better understanding, and 
greater productivity, rather than affecting the bases of power relation, be it a 
father/son, CEO/subordinate, or even military commander/troops relationship. 
Since this legitimacy has its basis in cultural values and social structure; trust 
would be facilitated by the presence of “normative coherence,”97 which also 
determines the ‘range, and influence of legitimate power.’ This form of social 
power is derived by the TTP from religion. The Madrassas, which are considered 
holy places of religious education, have been used by the TTP to recruit fresh 
blood and establish legitimacy of their cause with promises of heaven’s after life, 
if martyred while fighting enemies of Islam. We need to counter this legitimacy of 
their cause by controlling Madrassas education and involving Muslim scholars 
from all sects to clearly define the parameters of conflict and to put the historical 
evidences into the right perspectives which have been used otherwise by the 
terrorists.  
Since 9/11, studies into terrorist network systems have brought forward 
the idea of a nodal framework where the value created by different nodes makes 
them part of the greater system based on common cause (or fame) of Al-Qaeda. 
During his days in Iraq, General McChrystal observed that the enemy appeared 
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as a constellation of fighters, organized not by rank, but on the basis of 
relationships and acquaintances, reputation, and fame. Who became radicalized 
in the prisons of Egypt? Who trained together in the pre-9/11 camps in 
Afghanistan? Who is married to whose sister? Who is making a name for himself, 
and in doing so burnishing the al Qaeda brand?98 This behavior of individuals 
under Al-Qaeda’s influence forms a good example of what French and Raven 
have termed as referent power.99 This is a serious concern for the Pakistani 
military, while conducting counter-insurgency operations in the FATA region. The 
porous border with Afghanistan in the northwestern region makes it difficult for 
the forces to isolate these networks from their links across border. Similarly, 
expert power is also related to the TTP’s claim that they are true representatives 
of Islam, and that whatever they do is what Allah wills them to do. This narrative 
needs to be addressed by exposing the evil faces through extended media 
campaign against the group. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY—INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
AND TERRORISM 
This chapter covers the measures taken by the Sri Lankan government to 
effectively counter the LTTE (Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in 2009, and 
by the United States to curb the spread of terrorism there after 9/11. We chose to 
study the Sri Lanka model, as it was a recent example of a developing country 
defeating a terrorist organization. The strength of LTTE, frequent use of suicide 
bombers and its psychological support from the Tamil diaspora all around the 
world, made the organization very strong with an effective information operation 
campaign. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security gives a futuristic view of 
how technology can be best made use of to counter terrorism. In order to 
manage the length of the chapter, only relevant details are being covered, 
keeping in mind that these details have some relevance to counter terrorism in 
Pakistan. 
A. SRI LANKA AND LTTE (LIBERATION OF TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM) 
Before discussing the Sri Lankan fight against the LTTE, we shall briefly 
look at the information environment of Sri Lanka with focus on all three 
dimensions: the information domain (how information flows), the physical domain 
(use of infrastructure), and the cognitive domain (to understand the target 
audience). Sri Lanka has a 91.2 percent literacy rate (2008–2012),100 and the 
primary languages are Sinhala, Tamil and English. 74.88 percent of population is 
Sinhalese (largest ethnic group) and 11.2 percent are Tamils.101 The news and 
media use all three major languages (Sinhala, Tamil, and English). Television, 
radio, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet are the main sources that 
spread information. The fast growing usage of the Internet, television and radio 
                                            
100 UNICEF, “Srilanka–Statistics,” accessed on August 19, 2014, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sri_lanka_statistics.html. 
101 Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Census of Population and 
Housing 2011–Population by Ethnicity (Sri Lanka Government, April 20, 2012). 
 44 
has resulted in reduction of newspaper readers. The Sri Lankan government kept 
tight control over the media due to the fear of an anti-government campaign. 
Since 1992, four successive governments did not issue radio broadcast licenses 
to non-profit, non-governmental, or cooperative groups, perceiving the concern 
that they may take an anti-government stand on social and political issues.102 
However, in 2002 when the LTTE and Sri Lankan government entered a peace 
talk, the government permitted the LTTE to broadcast the ‘Voice of Tigers (VoT)’ 
radio channel and to import U.S. $10,000 worth of radio equipment.103 VoT 
became the main source of information for local and international media. 
Television broadcast was also largely viewed across Sri Lanka, as the Sri Lanka 
Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) was able to reach 84 percent of the 
population.104 The Sri Lankan government made it compulsory to broadcast the 
state television news bulletin on other channels.105 Many news agencies and 
journalists were threatened for their critical views about the government in 
2008/09. The editor of The Sunday Leader newspaper was killed in 2009 
allegedly for anti-government coverage.106 Under such circumstances, VoT and 
the propaganda campaign of the LTTE continued to gain support of Tamils. The 
LTTE was also successful in indoctrination of young Tamils for suicide attacks. 
The conviction behind such daring acts was a strong belief in the afterlife, “there 
are no bodies, only seeds, they say. Once the dream of Tamil Eelam is achieved, 
the story goes; they will rise up as trees.”107 In some cases, the indoctrination 
was believed to be based on becoming heroes’ for other Tamils. Sri Lanka is also 
following the world with social media shaping to be major source of information 
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flow and perception management. A research study conducted during the 2010 
Presidential Election among undergraduates of the University of Colombo, found 
that first-time voters were influenced by social media videos /campaigns. The 
results revealed that peer interactions through social media were a significant 
source of influence for political attitude formation.108 
The Sri Lankan tactics to eliminate the LTTE are being studied by many 
security establishments, as these did not conform to the well-known theories and 
widely-practiced counter-insurgency teachings. The social movement of Tamil 
Tigers took the shape of insurgency in 1970s. Mishandling of the situation and 
adoption of poor policies by the majority Sinhala (74 percent) ethnic group led to 
the insurgency, which lasted till 2009. The objective of the LTTE was to create a 
separate homeland for the Tamils known as the Tamil Elam (State) in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.109 The geographic location of the 
LTTE stronghold was different from the Pakistani Tribal region where terrorist 
can easily slip away in mountains. The LTTE insurgents could not run away un-
observed in the waters of the Indian Ocean. However, the strength of the LTTE 
was much more than the terrorist groups Pakistan is facing. We shall discuss the 
LTTE more as a system than an organization, because of its capability to run a 
parallel government and hold a field army of around 20,000, along with a 
sizeable navy and an air force. Tamil Tigers made use of GPS guided systems 
for missile accuracy well before the Sri Lankan military did.110 The LTTE had the 
hybrid strategy and capability of using combination of insurgency, irregular 
warfare, suicide attacks, and conventional warfare to achieve its end state,111 
which was to create a Greater Tamil Elam for Tamil community. The individual 
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part of the LTTE was also very effective and important. Its chief (Velupillai 
Prabhakaran) was a key element in upkeep of the LTTE and his elimination was 
a target set by the Sri Lankan government to defeat the LTTE.  
1. The LTTE Structure and Governance  
The LTTE112 was organized into two wings; a military wing and a 
subordinate political wing. Overseeing both was a central governing committee, 
headed by the the LTTE Chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran. This body had the 
responsibility of directing and controlling several subdivisions. The central 
governing committee also had an International Secretariat, which was in charge 
of the outfit’s global network. Prabhakaran headed the LTTE power structure, 
and was assisted by a political advisor and intelligence chief. In the LTTE 
controlled areas, the organization set up a parallel (to Sri Lankan government) 
civil administration which included police, courts, postal services, banks, 
administrative offices, and television and radio broadcasting stations. The police 
force was organized into several wings, including traffic, crime prevention, crime 
detection, information bureau, administration and a special force. The LTTE 
cadres were used to collect taxes and courts administered their version of justice 
and law. 
2. Use of Information Dimensions 
LTTE made effective use of its diaspora to lobby against the Sri Lankan 
Sinhala government. They made use of electronic, print media, and cyberspace. 
As a violent non-state actor, the LTTE had an edge on propaganda and 
information over the government as they had no responsibility to the international 
community on what they had to say or do. In contrast, Sri Lankan action was 
under the observation of the UN and international NGOs. At the international 
level, LTTE identified foreign governments as targets and used its diaspora to 
influence them. Front organizations of the LTTE, namely the World Tamil Forum 
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(WTF), British Tamil Forum (BTF), Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), and 
other lobby groups functioned as LTTE diplomatic missions to carry the LTTE 
message to the international community.113 In the UK, the LTTE lobby offered the 
Labor government some 40,000 votes in parliamentary elections in return for 
support on Tamil demands in Sri Lanka.114 The campaign carried out by the 
Tamil diaspora was so successful that the majority of the international community 
was reluctant to supply arms to the Sri Lankan government. Within LTTE, all 
cadres were indoctrinated that they were fighting against an unresponsive and 
discriminatory Sinhalese majority for a separate State—Eelam. The cadres were 
to banish all fear of death from their minds and be prepared to lay down their 
lives fighting the Government forces or consume the cyanide pill fastened around 
their necks when capture is imminent. The LTTE placed immense emphasis on 
the cult of martyrdom.115 
3. The LTTE Financial Situation 
To survive as a system, LTTE needed a considerable amount of money. It 
collected approximately $200M per year through legal and illegal ventures.116 
LTTE collected money from diaspora, fund raisings, coercion, human trafficking, 
shipping, and legal/illegal businesses. The majority of gas stations in London 
were owned by Tamils. LTTE trafficked people for a fee as high as $15,000, and 
they were forced to protest against the Sri Lankan government else they lose the 
refugee status (use of coercive power).117 LTTE also reportedly raised money 
through drug running, particularly heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia.118  
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4. LTTE Military System 
The LTTE maintained their own army, air force, and navy; however, 
varying details about the strength of the LTTE were observed. The Sri Lankan 
Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, estimated the strength 
to be 3,000 in 2007, and then about 4,500 in 2008. At its peak, the LTTE is 
estimated to have cadre strength of about 18,000119 to 20,000.120 The LTTE navy 
had more than 300 vessels, six submersibles, and 17 large commercial 
vessels.121 It was able to influence sea lines of communication with the help of 
said power. The LTTE air force had 11 aircraft and a considerable quantity of 
land weapons. The LTTE also had an amphibious group (the Sea Tigers), an 
airborne group (the Air Tigers), an elite fighting wing, a suicide commando unit 
(known as the Black Tigers), and a secret intelligence group.122 LTTE controlled 
over 15,000 square kilometers or nearly one-fourth of the territory of Sri Lanka. A 
study by a UK-based Sri Lankan researcher Dushy Ranatunge revealed that at 
least 60 per cent of the dead LTTE fighters were under 18 and were mostly girls 
and boys aged 10–16.123 
5. Defeat of LTTE—Steps Taken by Sri Lankan Government 
This part of our research will touch upon all the significant measures taken 
by the Sri Lankan government to defeat the LTTE. The discussion of measures is 
not limited to the use of information, as discussing the information environment in 
isolation will not complete the entire picture. However, coverage of various 
measures is as per their relevance for further development of this 
research/thesis. 
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In 1987, the Sri Lankan government made an amendment to the 
constitution which gave more powers to the provinces to help them in over 
powering the ethnic issue of Tamil and Sinhala. Percy Mahendra ‘Mahinda’ 
Rajapaksa formed the government in Sri Lanka in 2005 with a will to win the war 
against the LTTE. He created the NSC (National Security Council), which had 
representation from all elements of national power to facilitate decision making. 
NSC also ensured that interference was not done in various department works 
after policy guidelines were given. The Sri Lankan government grand strategy 
involved three key elements; define, isolate and defeat.  
a. Define 
To address the issue of the LTTE, it was important to define the target: 
who were the LTTE actors? What were their actions? What were their targets? 
This was similar to defining the enemy in a war for formulation of a 
comprehensive grand strategy, for all the elements of national power to act 
coherently. Sri Lankan government focused on actor, action, target, and motive 
as key factors in defining terrorism.124  
b. Isolate 
Isolation of the LTTE involved the maximum use of the information 
environment. Isolation of the LTTE as a system was considered in terms of 
regional and international influence. Diplomatic measures were used at 
international/regional level, while the government made use of psychological 
operations to cause differences in the LTTE internally. The government identified 
India as the key target to isolate the LTTE internationally and Tamil community in 
Sri Lanka, to isolate the LTTE internally in Sri Lanka. To strengthen the state and 
weaken the LTTE, Sri Lankan government tried to manage the influence and 
support from India to the LTTE (sanctuaries and supplies). Meanwhile, the Sri 
Lankan government also wanted the continued support of SARRC, China, and 
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Pakistan. A special team headed by a cabinet minister was formed to continually 
engage the Indian government and obtain Indian support. The measures also 
helped in getting cooperation to fight the LTTE—arms from Pakistan and China, 
intelligence from India and satellite imagery from the United States to pinpoint 
and intercept vessels ferrying arms to the Tigers up north. The President of Sri 
Lanka, Mahinda Rakapaksa, overhauled Sri Lanka’s intelligence system and 
clamped down on the financial activity of Tamils living overseas.125 Wrong efforts 
and policies of LTTE—antagonizing the Indian government by violating the Indo-
Lanka agreement, causing casualties to the Indian Peace Keeping Force, killing 
Indian former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and relying on the Diaspora, while 
neglecting and harassing the local Tamil community, helped Sri Lankan 
government.126 Moreover, effective special efforts were used in addition to the 
diplomatic process and Sri Lanka was able to gain support of 32 countries and 
isolate the LTTE regionally and internationally.127 Government also made an 
endeavor to isolate LTTE from other anti-state groups. This lengthy process also 
influenced the break-away factions of the LTTE to join the main stream of 
politics, further isolating the LTTE from the society. The government backed 
these splinter movements with military force and money. The major damage to 
the LTTE was the defection and joining of government by its eastern commander 
with 7,500 cadres.128 The government used the differences between the LTTE 
eastern and northern wings, making the LTTE leadership (which came from the 
northern areas around Jaffna) question the loyalty of Tamils from the east.129 The 
Sri Lankan government also ensured that the economic development continued 
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to meet financial requirements, thus striking a balance between use of force and 
fostering economic prosperity. Subsequently with its information campaign, 
normalcy in other parts of the country, economic development, and a continuous 
political process, the national will to fight the LTTE and bear losses and 
causalities, was maintained until the end. 
c. Defeat 
To achieve its desired end state, the Sri Lankan government used military 
power in concert with other elements of national power. During an interview, Sri 
Lanka’s then Army Chief Sarath Fonseka explained the difference between 
earlier military campaigns and this one in one simple sentence, “this time we 
were playing for a win, not for a draw.”130 Sri Lankan military fought like its 
enemy, organizing smaller units of four-or-eight-man teams that operated as de 
facto mobile commando squads. They were able to infiltrate Tiger strongholds 
and assassinate rebel leaders. The government’s defense spokesperson, 
Keheliya Rambukwella, stated in 2009, “we were a conventional army fighting 
with a guerrilla, and in some form our army was converted to a guerilla [army] 
to...fight the LTTE.”131 The LTTE areas of occupation were divided into north and 
east. The eastern part was dealt with first. The military was able to push the 
militants to two jungles and isolate the civilians with skillful use of information 
warfare and military maneuvers. The military then sealed off the jungles and 
cleared them one-by-one. The military operation took one year to complete. In 
May 2008, provincial elections were held in the eastern province and democracy 
was restored. A renegade LTTE leader turned politician, Mr. Chandrakanthan 
Pillayan, took office as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province with full 
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blessings of the Sri Lanka’s ruling party.132 In the north, the LTTE tried to prevent 
civilians’ separation from them. The state’s military innovatively changed tactics 
to cater to the new LTTE threats and concepts. The army’s SOF Long Range 
Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) took the lead in destabilizing the LTTE by 
effectively attacking the LTTE, and calling in strategic air strikes to destroy the 
LTTE’s high value targets. These attacks eliminated and destabilized the LTTE’s 
top leadership and communication nodes. The LTTE rear areas became 
vulnerable to SOF attacks. Successful deep operations forced the LTTE to 
employ cadres for rear area security by weakening and exposing the 
conventional defense fortresses. The high-intensity operation progressed until 
January 2009 when the army and the government faced a new challenge. The 
LTTE forcefully kept the civilians with them. The LTTE’s R2P (responsibility to 
protect) concept worked and western governments, without exerting pressure on 
the LTTE to release civilians, exerted tremendous political pressure on the 
government to terminate the offensive. However, the government continued the 
offensive to the end. On May 19, 2009, the security forces completed the 
humanitarian operation by liberating 295,000 people and killing the entire LTTE 
leadership including its leader Velupillai Parabakaran.133 To effectively control the 
flow of information, the Sri Lankan government restricted access of journalists 
and humanitarian workers to the war zone. Some of the humanitarian 
organizations and individual journalists were branded as sympathizers of Tamil 
Tigers,134 which helped in reducing the effectiveness of their reports. 
The military operation from 2007 to 2009 was quite heavy in terms of 
battle casualties. Approximately 2,000 soldiers left the battle every month due to 
death, injuries, and absence without official leave. To effectively cover up the 
manpower deficiency, about 3,000 soldiers were recruited every month. These 
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soldiers replaced the 2,000 casualties and the other 1,000 were used to 
reorganize battalions and raise two additional battalions per month. 
From 2007 to 2009, to provide for the large troop requirement, the Sri 
Lanka army raised 96 battalions, 28 brigades, and 12 divisions.135  
6. Conclusions from Sri Lankan Model of Fighting LTTE 
The salient of Sri Lankan model which merit attention, in view of our 
research focus are as under: 
a. Grand Strategy 
Everything worked as part of an overall strategy. The government had 
been fighting the LTTE for decades and learned from the mistakes it made and 
peculiarities of the LTTE. All these were used to formulate a grand strategy 
involving all elements of national power. The use of the information environment 
was not the sole factor for defeat of the LTTE. However, isolation of the LTTE 
(due to effective management of the information environment) was a significant 
achievement without which an all-out military operation would not have been 
possible amidst international pressure and covert support channels of the LTTE. 
The composition of the NSC strengthened the civil-military relationship. The 
political leadership of Sri Lanka stood by the military even under tremendous 
western pressure. 
b. Desperation to Cure 
Having experienced the terrorism of the LTTE for over three decades, the 
nation and political leadership was desperate to fight and resolve the issues. This 
led to national unity and set the background to bear loses for a bright and 
peaceful future. 
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c. Information Environment 
The Sri Lankan government identified the target audience at the national 
and international level. At both fronts, the audience was targeted with different 
means and objectives. The state used information operations to gain support of 
all the anti-state organizations working on the island to join for the ultimate cause 
of defeating the LTTE. The government relied on a divide-and-conquer strategy. 
In the case of Afghan Taliban, the U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has 
spoken about the need to “peel off those [Taliban] who are willing to renounce 
violence.”136 Similarly, the Sri Lankan government was successful at exploiting 
fissures within the LTTE leadership, with effective use of the information domain. 
The appointment of a former LTTE leader as Chief Minister of the eastern 
province also proved a contributing step to gain support of Tamils and convey a 
message to LTTE that government was willing to accommodate Tamil concerns. 
The tempo of operation and information environment dominance, within Sri 
Lanka, ensured that the military was able to meet the increased recruiting 
requirements. At termination of the campaign, the army had 21 divisions, 60 
brigades and 204 battalions as compared to 9 divisions, 32 brigades and 155 
battalions in mid-2006. The strength was increased from 125,000 to 200,000; an 
increase of 69 percent.137 The Sri Lankan government also took advantage of the 
international psychological environment of fighting terrorism after 9/11 incident. It 
helped in isolating LTTE and gaining help of the international community, which 
understood the meaning of fighting terrorism after 9/11. The Sri Lankan 
government managed the information from the battle zone from only one outlet 
provided by the state Media Centre. The physical domain was controlled by the 
state, and only required/treated information was sent out. With this arrangement, 
the government eliminated the possibility of any other source giving news to the 
information seekers. Inside Sri Lanka, the government also blocked pro-LTTE 
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blogs and websites such as Tamilnet.com. The information media were not 
satisfied with this one-sided picture. This led to an unfavorable situation toward 
the end of campaign, when the media became too critical toward the 
government. This teaches a lesson to include media handling as part of grand 
strategy and deal it effectively at every stage of the fight. 
d. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)  
The LTTE138 made use of psychological operations by projecting to the 
western world that the only way of saving civilians was to rescue them, during the 
final stages of the battle. Innocent civilians paid the price as at places (especially 
in the north) they could not be separated and were used to draw the attention of 
the international community. While R2P should remain as a goal, fighting 
terrorism in which the enemy resides within the civil population can cause issues 
related to collateral damage. This would demand effective use of the information 
environment to prepare the minds of national and international audiences before 
and during the use of force. 
e. Military Defeat of Terrorism 
The Sri Lankan defeat of the LTTE is an example of military success in 
crushing/eliminating a terrorist organization. It negates the argument that 
insurgencies require non-military or political solutions. This type of model is 
possible with full national support/backing, until military success is achieved. As 
Seth Jones of RAND and others have noted, military force—although only 
successful seven percent of the time—tends to be most effective against groups 
that are “large, well-armed, and well-organized.”139 Indeed, the lesson learned 
from Sri Lanka is that overwhelming force is necessary to win a war against a 
determined enemy like the Taliban or Tamil Tigers. 
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f. Support of International Community 
The support of the regional and international community was important to 
isolate the LTTE. The international community helped the Sri Lankan government 
in terms of technology and intelligence sharing to track down the LTTE leaders. 
Colombo also received dollops of military and economic aid from China, which 
has vested interest in the waterway and ports along the island’s southern 
periphery.140 
g. Regional Geopolitics 
Regional dynamics and geopolitics should be given due importance while 
formulating a grand strategy for counter terrorism. Regional interests and 
involvement of neighboring countries may pose serious problems in the fight 
against insurgent groups. In the Sri Lanka and LTTE case, this concern was 
seen once India got involved in 1980s. International players act for their national 
interest, and most of the time their interest is aligned with regional powers rather 
than small nations like Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy towards India, during 
the 2000/2009 period, paid rich dividends in defeating the LTTE.141 The narrative 
for gaining regional/international support through information operations should 
cater for the interest of dominating players. 
h. Long Term Solution 
Military success is only a temporary solution. Long term political measure 
would be required to sustain the achievements of a military campaign. If 
concerns of the Tamil community (ethnic discrimination, economic, and political 
marginalization) are not addressed, and their rich diaspora is not engaged 
effectively, the desire for a separate state and ideology will rise again. In 2011, 
the Tamil diaspora, which funded the LTTE from 1983 to 2009, established the 
Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Elam (PTGTE) in order to revive 
                                            
140 Lionel Beehner, “What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN,” Small War Journal 3 (8), 
(2010):  5. 
141 Ibid., 57. 
 57 
the separate state ideology. It is a litmus test and a challenge for the Sri Lankan 
government in the international scene over and above the reconciliation and 
reconstruction efforts in the post conflict situation to win over the influential 
diaspora and neutralize their separatism ideology.142 The audience at the 
international and national level must be kept engaged, even after the military 
defeat, to curb resurfacing of terrorism.  
B. UNITED STATES (INTERNAL) COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES 
AFTER 9/11 
The U.S. society is technology savvy in that people have access to 
advanced information technologies. This enables the easy flow of information 
and at a higher speeds, especially when everything is linked with the Internet. 
The right to freedom of speech and information makes information flow easier 
through the U.S. society. Public broadcasting is therefore an important issue for 
the government, which is why it is partly government-funded, but also supported 
by private grants.143 Realizing the importance of public broadcasting in shaping 
public opinion inside and outside the U.S., the U.S. government sponsors TV and 
radio stations to target public opinion outside the U.S. Within the country, 
television is considered as the most popular medium of communication. Fox 
News is the dominant U.S. cable news network.144 Approximately 10,000 
commercial radio stations provide news and entertainment to people belonging to 
every walk of life. Satellite radio offers a huge collection of channels that attract 
the vast majority of customers. There are more than 1,500 daily newspapers in 
the U.S., most of them with a local or regional readership.145 However, only six 
giant companies control almost 90 percent of the media,146 which is considered a 
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cause of non-diversity in news. Like Sri Lanka and most of the other countries of 
the world, audiences are turning toward the Internet for news, resulting in a 
decline of printed newspapers. Approximately 270 million Americans are 
online,147 comprising more than 78 percent of the population. Seventy-four 
percent use social networks and blogs.148 With reliance on use of the Internet, 
electronic transactions, and other networks for day to day routine tasks, it is 
much easier to track suspected people and manage the flow of information. 
The overall dynamics of how terrorism affects the world environment was 
seen after 9/11. The U.S. was worst effected by terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 and the incidents exposed weaknesses in U.S. security and defense 
system. The study of measures taken by the government (with focus on internal 
U.S. measures) would help in determining the best practices to track and counter 
terrorism by one of the most effected and advanced countries of the world. Here, 
the scope of the discussion is restricted to measures which may have some 
relevance for a developing country like Pakistan. 
Immediately after 9/11, the U.S. government made laws and passed 
executive orders to help prevent any further attack. Although laws are strict and 
at times compromising, civil liberties have been successful in averting any major 
incident on U.S. soil. 
1. U.S. Patriot Act 
The Patriot Act was passed within weeks after the terrorist incident of 
9/11. It included laws allowing surveillance of citizens and reduced the checks on 
law enforcement agencies. The measure included powers to conduct 
surveillance without warrants, monitor financial transactions, and detain/deport 
suspected individuals. In December 2005, the New York Times disclosed that in 
2002 President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
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access certain phone calls and emails without any legal warrant.149 In July 2008, 
Congress passed a bill that gave legal immunity to the telephone companies that 
participated in the NSA program. The Obama administration continued old laws 
and further expanded to monitor networks of telecommunications companies and 
made sure that the technology does not interrupt surveillance.150 This is a good 
example of monitoring the physical and information domains of the information 
environment. 
2. Go-It-Alone Defense Doctrine  
The new U.S. defense doctrine151 was announced by President Bush in a 
June 2002 speech at West Point. It summarized The National Security Strategy 
of the United States, and laid emphasis on pre-empting and taking anticipatory 
actions to prevent any act of terrorism. The document states: “taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place 
of the enemy’s attack.” The doctrine declared that U.S. “will not hesitate to act 
alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively 
against…terrorists.” In February 2011, the Obama Administration revised the 
country’s military strategy, expanding the focus to other areas of potential 
threats, including Asia and other parts of the Middle East. The National Military 
Strategy of the United States of America of 2011 recognizes a shift in geopolitical 
dynamics toward coalitions built on shared ideology and away from cold war 
alliances. The document outlines four goals: countering violent extremism, 
deterring and defeating aggression, strengthening international and regional 
security, and shaping the future military.  
                                            





3. Military Tribunals and Guantánamo  
In November 2001, an order was signed that called for foreigners charged 
with terrorism to be tried by military tribunals and classified as illegal enemy 
combatants. Such tribunals permitted the admission of hearsay and evidence 
obtained under coercion, and allowed secret evidence that would be shown to 
the jury but not the defendant. In addition, the defendant could be excluded from 
portions of his own trial.152 
4. Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 
The Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the 
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and created the position 
of Secretary of Homeland Security. The DHS united 22 agencies and 170,000 
workers. The department implemented an alert system with two levels: ‘elevated’ 
and ‘imminent’. The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) provides 
detailed information about terrorist threats and recommends security measures 
to the public, government agencies, airports, and other hubs.153 The DHS laid out 
various objectives to counter violent extremism:154 
a. Understanding Violent Extremism 
Support and coordinate efforts to better understand the phenomenon of 
violent extremism, including assessing the threat it poses to the nation as a 
whole and within specific communities. 
b. Support Local Communities 
Bolster efforts to catalyze and support non-governmental, community-
based programs, and strengthen relationships with communities that may be 
targeted for recruitment by violent extremists. 
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c. Support Local Law Enforcement 
Disrupt and deter recruitment or individual mobilization through support for 
local law enforcement programs, including information-driven, community-
oriented policing efforts that for decades have proven effective in preventing 
violent crime. 
As part of its effort to support local network systems to counter violent 
extremism, DHS launched a number of core initiatives155: 
 DHS Conferences and Workshops on Countering Violent 
Extremism  
With federal partners, DHS hosts conferences and workshops for 
law enforcement to better educate them about countering violent 
extremism. 
 Training Initiatives 
DHS is working with the Department of Justice and has trained 
hundreds of thousands of front line officers on suspicious activities 
reporting and countering violent extremism. 
 Grants 
DHS has prioritized prevention activities through grants that directly 
support local law enforcement efforts to understand, recognize, 
prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist pre-cursor activity, 
and separately to raise public awareness and vigilance through the 
‘If You See Something, Say Something’ campaign. 
 Other Measures 
In 2011 a progress report was published by the DHS listing the 
steps taken (based on recommendations of the September 11 
Commission) to protect the country against another terrorist attack. 
The report noted the following accomplishments: 
(1) The “If You See Something Say Something” campaign was 
launched to raise public awareness about indicators of terrorism and crime, and 
encouraged citizens to report suspicious activity to law enforcement authorities. 
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(2) Screening of passengers flying into, out of, or within the U.S. has 
been enhanced and all baggage is screened for explosives. 
(3) The Visa Security Program has been implemented at 19 areas in 
15 countries known for high-risk visa activity. Officials conduct targeted, in-depth 
reviews of visa applications and applicants before they are allowed to travel to 
the U.S.. 
(4) The Country’s cyber networks and infrastructure security has been 
improved through creation of the National Cybersecurity Protection System and 
the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. 
(5) Expanded information sharing. DHS made an effort to control the 
physical and information domains of the information environment. This helped in 
apprehending individual terrorists, pre-empting terrorist acts, and tracing out the 
network. DHS created 72 ‘fusion centers’ throughout the country to gather, share, 
and analyze threat-related information with federal, state, and local agencies.156 
Major urban areas also began to adopt a Terrorism Early Warning Group 
(TEWG) model to bring agencies together to analyze terrorist threats for their 
jurisdiction and to disseminate intelligence information. The focus later shifted to 
fusion centers which took an all crime/all hazard approach versus strict counter 
terrorism approach of TEWG.157 Internationally, DHS encouraged sharing of 
information about terrorists and criminals with global partners. A nationwide 
suspicious activity reporting initiative was created, which trains state and local 
law enforcement officials to recognize behaviors and indicators related to 
terrorism, crime, and other threats and standardizes how the observations should 
be managed.158 As the time passed, LEAs of large urban areas started using 
information technology to organize virtually, and to share information in fusion 
centers. It reduced the requirement of resources, made better linkage among the 
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participants, facilitated in identifying connections between different terrorist-
related activities. Fusion centers centralized and formalized the sharing of 
information/intelligence among participants and federal intelligence departments. 
Earlier the information sharing was limited to personal contact and visits of LEA 
officers to other departments that restricted the speed and amount of sharing of 
information and intelligence. 
Table 1.   The evolution of law enforcement information and 
intelligence sharing.159 
 
In addition to local law enforcement, the FBI shifted its mission to include 
a focus on Counter Terrorism (CT) following the 9/11 attacks. The FBI is 
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designated as the lead federal agency for investigating acts of domestic and 
international terrorism. Primarily it conducts CT investigations through Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The JTTFs (along with FBI field offices) are 
responsible for national infrastructure protection and for investigations involving 
domestic and international acts of terrorism and the use of WMD. The JTTFs are 
composed of teams of state and local LEA representatives, FBI agents, and 
representatives of other federal agencies. In addition, the FBI has directed that 
its field offices become involved with the fusion centers, given their growing role 
in the sharing of homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement 
information.160 
5. Conclusions from Internal U.S. Measures to Counter Terrorism 
after 9/11 
Keeping in view our research focus, the salient drawn from U.S. model are 
as under: 
a. Legislative Needs 
For the new kind of threat, amendments in the laws were needed to track 
down terrorists. U.S. gave legal cover to the LEAs by passing acts/bills/laws, 
giving expanded powers to monitor communication and financial transactions, 
and detain/deport suspected individuals. Side effects of such laws can also be 
observed, especially once they are implemented for prolonged period. Over use 
of wiretaps on individuals and business, unjustified detention of people, 
deportation of immigrants, and less scrutiny of LEA acts have made civil 
libertarians criticize the laws and term them as violation of human rights. Laws, 
though a must to curb terrorism, need to be reviewed frequently. Moreover, such 
acts where needed must be supported with an information campaign highlighting 
their need as the only medicine to cure disease.  
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b. Pre-empt to Counter Terrorism 
The terrorist threat is fast evolving and a reactive strategy may not work. 
U.S. defense doctrine161 created the required framework on pre-empting and 
taking anticipatory actions to prevent any act of terrorism. For effective pre-
emption, management of the information environment domains is very important. 
The campaign of, “If You See Something, Say Something,” made information 
audience as informers. The more effective audience/informers are equipped with 
identifying and willingly reporting odd activities; decreasing the chance that 
terrorist acts go unnoticed.  
c. Military Tribunals 
The use of Military tribunals and illegal detention of suspected foreigners 
(at Guantanamo) may be required from military perspective; however, the U.S. 
could not make clean use of it. Classification of detainees as illegal enemy 
combatants and not prisoners of war went against the Geneva Convention. The 
permission of admitting hearsay and evidence obtained under coercion—without 
showing it to the defendant—and news about prisoner abuse at few of the 
detention centers, led to widespread criticism. 
d. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Measures taken by the DHS to understand violent extremism, involve local 
communities in “If You See Something, Say Something,” increased vigilance at 
the ports/air ports, awareness and training programs, increased funding for anti-
terrorism measures, visa security program, and cyber security, and above all, the 
formulation and use of ‘fusion centers’ provided the filter to separate extremists 
from peace loving citizens. The benefits of counterterrorism and Homeland 
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Security have been comprehensively covered in a RAND report prepared for 
National Institute of Justice:162 
Table 2.   Summary of the benefits of a focus counterterrorism and 
homeland security.163 
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Long-term focus on CT and HS represents a cultural or paradigm shift 
toward greater collaboration, including less-territorial attitudes and more 
openness in sharing of information. Fewer turf issues among local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies. 
NIMS training 
 
Improved incident management of large-scale events in general 
(e.g., major sporting events, political events, or major holidays). 
Improvements in incident management involving multi-agency 
response, as well as these events allow law enforcement and 






HS training department-wide has improved the cops on the street 
awareness of WMD and what information to look out for and how 
to report it to their chain of command. 
Improved departments’ capabilities to respond to CBRNE-related 
incidents or other types of terrorist threats. 
HS training is now part of departments’ core curriculum with 
department-wide personnel being trained on WMD awareness 







Increased rapport and relationship building with community leaders. 
Assignment of special community liaison officers to do outreach to the 






Specialized tactical response units that were developed in response to 
9/11 to address CBRNE and terrorist-related attacks in general has had 
a spillover effect in that these units have helped law enforcement 
response capabilities in general for different types of incidents and 
emergencies. 
Specialized response units particularly have benefited from HS 








NIMS, as well as other specialized training, has improved incident 
management of large-scale events. 




manage HS grants and application process has also resulted in 
capacity-building within the departments to manage grants in 
general, and so the marginal costs of managing other grants may 
have been reduced. 
It also led to investments in the development of grants management 
systems (e.g., some departments for the first time set up formal grant 







Improved regional coordination and better coordination among local law 
enforcement agencies and other stakeholders agencies involved in CT 
and HS. 
Increased coordination and cooperation among law enforcement 
agencies and other stakeholder agencies concerned with CT and HS. 
Improved information-sharing of crime data benefits not only CT 
and HS, but also routine crime-fighting. Has improved departments’ 
abilities to address cross-jurisdictional crime and analysis of crime 
patterns. 
Improved analytic capabilities, although it varies across departments 
and degree to which information-sharing takes precedent over analysis 
of information. 
All-hazards approach and NIMS training means that departments are 
better able to coordinate and manage large-scale events involving a 
multi-agency response. 
Fusion centers have helped to formalize the diffusion 
process. In addition, by expanding the fusion centers’ networks 
to include other law enforcement agencies in a region this has 
led to improvements in informal information-sharing among 
agencies. Because fusion centers are connecting a number of 
law enforcement agencies in a region, it has also led to the 
development of informal relationships across departments (captain in 
department y now knows who to call in department x with questions, 





HS funding allowed LEAs to purchase equipment and standardize the 
equipment that all departments were using—however, this came at a 
significant cost, as discussed above. 
Specialized tactical response units in particular benefited from the 
grant funding that enabled purchasing of equipment such as PPE 
and radiological detectors. 
LEAs also used HS funding to leverage technology including 
upgrades to their communications systems to improve 
interoperability; camera network system for Department D; 
communications vehicles; bomb robots; laptops to improve virtual 









Technology also benefited non-case study LEAs who participated 
in the fusion centers and benefited from how the case study 
departments utilized UASI funding to improve coordination and 
connectivity with surrounding jurisdictions. 
LEAs also utilized software (e.g., COPLINK) to help generate leads 
more easily. 
Purchasing of equipment also had an impact on morale of employees in 
that they now felt they had the equipment needed to do their CT and 






This category is the most difficult to quantify. The departments all 
cited how their activities impacted routine crime-fighting, helped to 
connect the dots, etc. Difficult to quantify prevention. For example, one 
department postulated that at least 5 significant terrorist related 
incidents had been prevented. However, due to security concerns, 
departments were reluctant to give detailed information. Even so, it was 
difficult for departments to estimate the magnitude of events prevented. 
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V. TERRORIST USE OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
A. WHY DO TERRORISTS USE INFORMATION OPERATIONS?  
Terrorist organizations have used psychological warfare long before 
regular forces realized this domain. This is because of the fact that terrorist 
objectives are achieved psychologically, unlike a war of attrition. Information 
operations (psychological warfare) are the most preferred options that terrorists 
have to further their designs. To explore this aspect, we will briefly discuss two 
perspectives of terrorism in this chapter to see why terrorists use the information 
environment in the first place. First, the chapter examines Maurice Tugwell’s 
psychological strategy of terrorism. Tugwell suggests that terrorists employ a 
strategy of psychological influence, relying on the use of terror to coerce a 
government to make changes favorable to their cause. This strategy leverages 
the power of information to cause change and Tugwell claims “terrorists are in 
the business of changing minds.”164 Subsequently, the chapter addresses 
Gordon McComick’s terrorist influence process model. McCormick’s model 
provides insight into how most terrorist organizations exploit the information 
environment to influence their targets. His model walks through a four-step 
process that terrorists take to achieve their influence objective.165 Subsequently 
we would relate our findings to teachings of Al Qaeda (umbrella organization for 
most terrorist organizations around the world) in this domain. 
1. Maurice Tugwell’s Psychological Strategy of Terrorism 
Maurice Tugwell’s book “Democratic Response to International Terrorism,” 
1991, which is based on his experiences in Northern Ireland, has shed insight 
into the psychological strategy of terrorism. Tugwell’s perspective of this 
phenomenon suggests that terrorist organizations employ a long-term 
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psychological strategy to achieve their objectives. His approach supports this 
thesis by providing insight into why terrorists conduct violent attacks, and then 
offers evidence that terrorists rely on the psychological influence of their violence 
to achieve their objectives.166 Furthermore, Tugwell’s explanation illustrates the 
terrorists’ natural bridge to the information environment. Tugwell contends that 
the terrorist threat to societies and states is more about the adverse 
psychological influence they cause than the actual physical damage they inflict. 
He says “that terrorism essentially conforms to the Carl von Clausewitz’ claim 
that war is the continuation of politics by violent means.”167 Tugwell states that 
physical force replaces the failure of peaceful persuasion; however, persuasion 
remains the objective and the ultimate purpose of each action. He states that in 
the end “terrorists are trying to change the minds of their enemies.”168 Terrorism, 
more than any other form of conflict, moves back and forth across the line 
between peace and war. “One day its leaders address the public through the 
news media, in the manner of politicians; the next day, they blow an airliner out 
of the sky to underline their point.”169 
An ancient millenarian Jewish terrorist group known as the Zealots serves 
as an example to support Tugwell’s claim. From AD 66–73, the Zealots ruthlessly 
assassinated anyone having to do with the Roman Empire: army soldiers, 
administrators, and Jewish collaborators. Using short daggers, known as Sica, 
the terrorists would stage an attack in a busy square of the city or in an alley 
jammed with people. “The intimidator power of the Assassins rested on their 
reputation of always killing their chosen victims, however long it took.”170 The 
killing was usually very dramatic; the terrorists would emerge and slit the throat of 
the victim and then quickly retreat, blending back into the crowd. The violent 
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attacks were designed to have long lasting psychological repercussions far 
beyond the immediate audience—the 10 to 20 people who witnessed the event. 
Over time, the vicious reputation of the Zealots spread by word of mouth 
throughout all of present day Israel. Their reputation preceded them in the 
information environment to shape the perception of thousands of people, 
especially those opposed to the group and sympathetic to the Romans.171 As 
Tugwell points out, the Zealots relied more on the psychological influence of their 
reputation to influence the populace than the slaying of their victims. 
2. Gordon McCormick’s Influence Process of Terrorism 
Gordon McCormick, former Rand analyst and current Professor at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, suggests that nearly all terrorists follow a common 
influence process to achieve their objectives.172 McCormick’s influence model 
also supports Maurice Tugwell’s psychological strategy mentioned above. 
McCormick suggests that terrorists are naturally linked to the information 
environment, since they must follow logical steps in order to influence a decision 
maker. Figure 4 depicts McCormick’s influence process model with four steps 
and three orders of effects. 
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Figure 4.   McCormick influence process model173 
In the first step, the terrorists attack the immediate target, often involving 
dramatic acts of violence intended to capture the eye of the media. The 
immediate targets are often victims with no authority or individual ability to 
influence the government. Many terrorist attacks first appear like indiscriminate 
attacks; however, this is not true. Terrorist chose targets for their maximum 
publicity and to influence specific target audiences.174  
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The second target is the media, which generates the first order effect. The 
terrorists normally cannot control how the acts will be reported (negatively or 
positively). Knowing this, many terrorist organizations operate their own 
underground television, radio, and print media outlets. They also maintain their 
own informational websites on the Internet. Often they deliver a direct message 
to the media through a proxy courier or phone call. During the recent U.S. war in 
Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden provided videotaped interviews to Al-Jazeera in 
order to deliver his message.175  
The third step is when the media serves as the distribution point, 
propagating scenes of the attack to a wider audience, which is the target of 
influence. The second order effect occurs here. Today’s technology often allows 
near-real time video coverage of events. Al Qaeda’s attack against the U.S. 
World Trade Center and Pentagon and the Chechen hostage taking in Moscow 
serve as two examples of the media providing live coverage of an attack. CNN 
alerted the entire world to the first attack against the Pentagon and World Trade 
Center and then provided live footage as the second American Airliner exploded 
into the side of the World Trade Center and the subsequent collapse of the 
building. Another example came in 2003, with the live coverage of 50 Chechen 
terrorists holding nearly 900 Russian theatergoers hostage. Video coverage 
highlighted the commandos attempted rescue. The police employed gas during 
the attack to incapacitate the terrorists. Unfortunately, due to the concentration of 
the gas and poor health conditions of many of the hostages, over 100 hostages 
died during the attack. The media provides the terrorists with a conduit to four 
different audiences: opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active. The third 
order effect occurs when the target of influence reacts. The measure of success 
is determined by who gains and benefits, impacting the terrorist group and 
completing the cycle.176 
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The 1972 attack at the Munich Olympic Games provides an example of 
McCormick’s influence model. Eight members from the PLO’s Black September 
Organization had planned to take several Israeli athlete hostages and then make 
demands against the Israeli government to release Palestinian activists being 
held in prison. With the advent of television and worldwide broadcasting, the 
world watched as the German police foiled the Palestinians’ original plan to move 
the hostages from helicopters to an awaiting Lufthansa 747 airliner. During the 
ensuing gun battle with the Germans, a PLO activist leaped from one of the 
helicopters and tossed a hand grenade back into the cabin behind him, 
murdering all nine Israeli athletes with a hand grenade.177 Although the Black 
September operation failed to secure the freedom of their comrades in prison, 
the shock and violence of the attack at the Munich Stadium had a profound 
influence on television viewers around the world. The Israeli Olympic athletes 
served as a superb immediate target for the terrorists. The media coverage of the 
Games ensured that millions of people would be watching. Although Black 
September’s operation received negative publicity from the horrific fate of the 
athletes, the greater world audience became aware of the plight faced by the 
Palestinian refugees. Hoffman quotes Abu Iyad, the PLO’s Intelligence Chief, 
admitting,  
they did not bring about the liberation of their comrades imprisoned 
in Israel as they had hoped, but they did attain the operation’s other 
two objectives: world opinion was forced to take note of the 
Palestinian plight, and the Palestinian people imposed their 
presence on an international gathering that had sought to exclude 
them.178 
                                            
177 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 72. 
178 Ibid., 73. 
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B. AL-QAEDA AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
All that we have to do is to send two Mujahideen to the farthest 
point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written Al Qaeda in 
order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer 
human, economic and political losses without their achieving for it 
anything of note.179  
–Speech of Osama bin Laden broadcast in 2004 
Emphasis on information by Al Qaeda is apparent by going through its 
manual, the Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants.180 The document 
mentions ‘information’ as one of the requirements of a military organization to 
assist in ‘confrontation and endurance.’ Further, the document defines the 
following missions for its followers that have information as a major constituent:  
gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations and the 
neighbors; spreading rumors, and writing statements that instigate people 
against the enemy; kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets and arms; 
blasting and destroying the embassies; and attacking vital economic centers. 
These missions define the importance that an organization like Al Qaeda places 
on information as an asset and a tool for the conduct of its operations. The Jihad 
Manual also mentions that it is important to nullify the viewpoint of intellectuals 
and thinkers who oppose its view toward Jihad and the establishment of an 
Islamic state.  
The mention of Colonel John Boyd’s OODA181 (Observe, Orient, Decide, 
and Act) loop is also seen in the Jihad Manual, but from a different perspective 
where it mentions that the members of the terrorist organization should have 
‘necessary qualifications’ that include: intelligence and insight, ability to observe 
                                            
179 Osama bin Laden, from the transcript of a videotaped message released and aired on the 
Al Jazeera television network, as reported in the Washington Post on Nov 1, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16990-2004Nov1.html. 
180 “Declaration of Jihad Against the Tyrants,” accessed on August 19, 2014, 
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p15040coll2/id/3642. 
181 Ulhas Kirpekar, “Information Operations in Pursuit of Terrorists” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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and analyze, and an ability to act. These qualifications, along with keeping 
secrets and concealing information, confirm that information and the processes 
involved in exploiting information have been adequately ingrained in the Al 
Qaeda operating philosophy. The importance placed on the information 
environment by Al Qaeda could be gauged from the quote by their second-in- 
command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are 
in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.182  
The physical environment in which the terrorists operate is carefully 
crafted with the information environment always in perspective.183 Some cases, 
where the physical events are seemingly random, also tend to create a positive 
impact for the terrorists in the information environment.184 The adaptability of 
using information as an important resource, and the information environment as 
the dominant battleground, has created a virtual balance between conventional 
forces in the world and a comparatively small number of terrorists around the 
world.185 This ability of the terrorists to adapt in the information age is 
predominantly due to opportunities that they have accepted in using modern 
information technologies. In their paper, Arquilla and Ronfeldt have also 
remarked that the information revolution and the enabling information 
technologies, along with the adaptability of terrorist organizations to mesh into a 
networked force, are themselves among the primary enabling mechanisms for 
the emergence and subsequent growth of such non-state actors, with a 
considerable impact on global security.186 The importance of information is also 
                                            
182 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” accessed July 17, 2014, 
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184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
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felt by nation states around the world and is evident from the thoughts expressed 
by former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, before the United States 
embarked on the Global War on Terror. 
There will be, undoubtedly, some things that our military forces and 
the military forces of others can do. But this is also a war of will and 
mind, it is a war in which information may be the most important 
asset that we have. And so we’re asking a lot of countries to help 
us with information.187 
C. TERRORISTS USE OF PAKISTAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
Pakistan served as the breeding ground for fundamentalism and radical 
Islam during the Afghan-Soviet war. Jihad had a different connotation at that 
time, and was never labeled with terrorism. There was a clear distinction 
between “freedom fighters” and “terrorists.” The information environment 
described for Pakistan in Chapter II was purposely flourished and encouraged  in 
its efforts to recruit youth for Jihad (holy war) against the Soviets. The legacy has 
continued until now, and the seeds of fundamentalism and radicalization are still 
reaping crops in the Pakistani society. It would be prudent to discuss the 
exploitation of the information environment of Pakistan by terrorists under the 
same structure and definition of information environment as described earlier 
(i.e., aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems with cognitive domain, 
information domain, and physical domain constantly interacting within this 
framework). We will try to relate to Maurice Tugwell’s and Gordon McCormick’s 
theories with our framework.  
1. Individuals 
Chapter II explains the role of individuals in the information environment of 
Pakistan. There were no terrorist groups in Pakistan before 9/11. They were all 
Islamic militants fighting for the cause of Islam. They enjoyed public sympathy 
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and they were being supported by donations form the public through the 
Madrassas and mosques of the community. The Jihadists were well respected, 
as they were not only fighting Jihad in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir against 
the oppression of India. The narrative of Jihad as promulgated by the Mullah in 
Juma prayers (weekly congregational prayers every Friday) was aimed at 
increasing the legitimacy of war against non-Muslims. Once 9/11 happened, Al-
Qaeda was branded the number one terrorist of the world. The entire world came 
down hunting Al Qaeda and their Taliban affiliates in Afghanistan. This became 
the kind of incident Al-Qaeda was waiting for to build its narrative of “war against 
non-Muslims.” Tugwell and McCormick say that terrorists rely upon an incident 
as the first step of attacking the immediate target and achieving physiological 
effects on the society. In this case, the narrative was built in the information 
domain, mosques and Madrassas were used in the physical domain to gather 
public sympathy and legitimacy of war against occupying forces in Afghanistan 
(U.S. lead coalition forces). Pakistan, being the most important non-NATO ally, 
also came under this narrative and became a target of terrorist attacks. The 
peculiarities of the Pakistani information environment helped terrorists spread 
their message using CD/DVDs, audio cassettes, radio stations, and the platforms 
of mosques and Madrassas. The individual acceptance of the narrative was so 
great that it even penetrated into the ranks of military forces, and included 
examples of service personnel who were involved in plotting and executing 
terrorist attacks. 
The example of ‘Lal (Red) Mosque Military Operation’188 in 2007 against 
the students and clerics of a Madrassa, called ‘Jamia Hafsa,’ caused a paradigm 
shift in the threat perception regarding the role of Madrassa and mosque in 
spread of extremism in Pakistani society. In this particular example, the state 
tried all possible political means to negotiate, but their conviction (narrative) was 
                                            




so strong that even ‘Imam Kabaa’189 was refuted by them, and eventually military 
force was used after seven days of siege. Sixty lives were lost on both sides, and 
the mosque and seminary were damaged.190 
2. Organization 
The organizational contribution in the information environment of Pakistan 
was described in length in Chapter II. Taking the lead for the structure of terrorist 
organizations, in particular, in Chapter V regarding the TTP, we can safely say 
that the Pakistani information environment is quite conducive to terrorist aims. 
Here Tugwell’s notion is supported regarding the “terrorist threat in terms of 
adverse psychological influence rather than physical damage.” The “first order 
effect” (McCormick’s second step in the influence model) is achieved through 
DVDs, radio channels, pamphlets, Jihadi literature, and the door-to-door 
preaching as discussed in Chapter II. These means are used to publish their acts 
of terrorism, beheading of soldiers, last words of suicide bombers, claiming the 
responsibility for a particular incident and most importantly spreading the counter 
propaganda to military claims. To instill fear and obedience in locals of the area, 
TTP have been making use of radio programs, and pamphlets called 
“Shabnama.”191People are forced to read the Shabnamas and listen to radio 
programs out of dread and fear, as the terrorists announce their next targets. 
Those named as targets have to run for life or they would be killed. TTP have a 
designated media spokesman (Shahidullah Shahid, a well-known figure in 
Pakistani Media) like any other political party who is seen addressing media from 
undisclosed locations, giving policy statements. Unlike Al-Qaeda, which was 
relying on the Al Jazeera network for propagation of their psychological influence 
in the society (third step in McCormick’s model), TTP enjoys media coverage 
                                            
189 Imam KABAA is the Imam of holy mosque at Makkah where millions of Muslims go to 
perform pilgrimage. He is highly respected among the Muslims around the globe. 
190 Asad Hashmi, “Pakistan mulls tighter controls on madrassas,” Aljazeera, April 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/pakistan-tighter-controls-madrassas-
islamabad-201442064231355458.html. 
191 English translation of “Shabnama” is “night letters.” 
 80 
more than any other terrorist organizations in the country. TTP has been flexible 
in modifying its approach to interact with media effectively and reach out to the 
maximum audience. Baitullah Mehsud (founder of TTP) did not allow his 
photograph to be taken, declaring it un-Islamic, while the current Chief of TTP 
makes videos of his interviews and publicizes them. From a country that knew 
little about TTP as recently as four or five years ago, the Pakistani viewing public 
has become intimately acquainted with the agenda, views, threats, likes, dislikes, 
punishments, and statements of the group.192 
This legitimacy stems from the religious political parties in Pakistan that 
have yet to condemn openly the aims and objectives of TTP. As discussed 
earlier, these faith-based political parties have a common origin with the TTP 
(Madrassas); therefore, it is very difficult to refute the TTP’s narrative for them. 
This makes it possible for the TTP to enjoy political support in the cognitive 
domain of the Pakistani environment. Allegiance of the TTP with Al-Qaeda and 
Afghan Taliban gives them an outlet on international media, but they are 
considered facilitators more than actors at the international level. That is why the 
TTP does not rely on social media, the Internet, or other modern physical 
domains of information environment to spread their message or to act as 
recruitment centers. The one and only website launched by the TTP was 
effectively blocked by the state within 24 hours. An image of the TTP website is 
shown in Figure 5.193,194 
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Figure 5.  Screen shot of TTP official website, launched and taken down 
on April 7, 2014.  
3. System 
As discussed previously, the political system of Pakistan provides impetus 
and legitimacy to the cause of the TTP. It no longer exists as an organization, but 
has transformed into a ‘system of terrorism’ that provides accreditation to all 
affiliated organizations. This is a strength, but also presents an opportunity to be 
worked upon as a vulnerability. The strength of the TTP is in its “narrative” (fight 
for Islam is a duty of all Muslim), which exists in the information domain. 
Secondly, and most importantly, the effects generated by TTP in the cognitive 
domain of the Pakistani environment (political importance, recognition, public 
support) makes it into a “terrorist network” based on the system of religious 
radicalization and extremism. The physical domain of this system is the 
infrastructure, finances, numerical strength, public support, and propaganda tools 
being used. The peculiar information environment of Pakistan makes it very 
difficult to isolate the flow of information in this system. The TTP is cognizant of 
the fact that their system cannot survive without an effective propaganda tool. 
Establishment of media wing called “Omar TV” with the help of approximately 
sixty staff members (including qualified cameramen and editors) has been an 
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effort in this direction.195 The media teams of TTP accompany the terrorists 
during active operation (as embedded journalists) to record live action. CD/DVDs 
of terrorists action are made available in the markets of tribal areas. One such 
example is Bannu jail break to release more than 380 prisoners awaiting slow 
moving judicial process. Video of complete operation was released on by the 
Omar Studio. 
TTP as a system of religious terrorism, influences other terrorist 
organizations to form media wings. A few significant ones are:196 
 Jandullah Studio 
This studio focuses on Central Asian States (Uzbeks, Tajiks, 
Chechens and Turkmenistan). Most of these foreign terrorists know 
Pashto and Urdu as they have lived in the tribal belt since Afghan-
Soviet war.  
 Manba al-Jihad Studio 
This media group is considered to be working for the Haqqani 
network. Most of their propaganda is released in Pashtu, English, 
Urdu and Persian languages. This studio covers Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
 Ahya-e-Khilafat Magazine 
This Urdu magazine was started by the TTP’s Mohmand Agency 
chapter. But it has grown and almost become TTP’s official 
magazine. It gives TTP version on issues, mostly responding to 
attacks that come in media against it. 
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1. Terrorists use long-term psychological strategy to achieve their 
objectives. The violent attacks that terrorists do are more for the 
psychological effect/influence over the target audience rather than 
material damage.  
2. Media acts as a distribution point for terrorists as it propagates acts 
of violence. That is why their actions are directed to attract media 
attention and then achieve first order effects. Due to the role of 
media, terrorists maintain well-articulated and well thought media 
policy to support their psychological warfare. 
3. If we can control the information environment, we would be denying 
strategic freedom to the terrorist organizations. It is a difficult task 
because, friends and enemies alike share the information 
environment, and to isolate the enemy in such a vague scenario is 
very difficult. 
4. The information environment of each area, region and nation is 
dependent on its culture, local populace and many other 
peculiarities. Devising an information operation in a particular 
environment should involve considering the peculiarities of that 
environment. 
5. Considering the peculiarities of the Pakistani information 
environment, TTP has relied on DVDs, FM radios, Madrassas, and 
mosques to spread their message to the masses. 
6. Religious political parties in Pakistan are the main source of 
establishing legitimacy of the TTP as an organization and therefore 
they do not need special means to reach to masses. Their voice 
and stance is very easily communicated to even the legislatures. 
7. TTP does not have international aims; which limits the outfit 
geographically, and ideologically. 
8. The strength of TTP as a ‘system of systems lies in its narrative 
based on Islam, which needs to be countered at the ‘individual’ 
level of the information environment of Pakistan. 
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VI. COUNTERING TERRORISM 
Information environment management may not be sufficient to counter 
terrorism. However, it can be a major component to be used effectively in the 
overall strategy. This chapter will cover the required details by briefly defining the 
limitations in the grand strategy, and then getting into the details of information 
environment dimensions that will affect the individuals, organizations, and 
systems. We will discuss the role of different information domains that cause 
effects in the information environment. The control of domains is important to 
formulate a comprehensive information environment management policy. The 
chapter also supports the suggested measures through a system dynamics 
model, which would ease decision making and help in formulation of short and 
long term policy.  
A. OVERARCHING STRATEGY 
The Pakistani nation will have to be prepared for remedial measures, as 
security and comfort cannot come together. They are inversely proportional; you 
increase one and the other will decrease. Handling terrorism with the information 
environment will take time to show results; however, it has to be an essential part 
of overall strategy. Military solutions or applications of force cannot produce a 
long-term solution. Taking the lead from the Sri Lanka counter terrorist strategy 
against the LTTE, and keeping in view the peculiarities of the Pakistani 
environment, the suggested strategy to counter terrorism in Pakistan is two 
staged. The first stage is to counter the TTP, and the second stage (more 
important one), is based on measures to counter terrorism over a longer period.  
The strategy for the TTP is to define, isolate, and enforce law and order, 
while the long-term strategy is changing societal perceptions, political reforms, 
and pre-emption. Both strategies would start together, while long-term measures 
(including enforcement of law and order) should continue. For this thesis, we 
 86 
shall briefly touch the long-term measures and focus more on countering TTP 
with information environment control. 
B. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Management of information environment is dependent on cognitive 
dimension of individual level. Correct identification and handling of this level is 
essential for effective information operation.    
1. Understand/Define the TTP at an Individual Level 
There is a need to identify and clearly define the structure of the TTP. 
Who are the actors and what is their way of working as a system or organization? 
One fix for all may not be effective to address religious, sectarian, and ethnic 
extremism. Every issue needs be considered based on actors, objectives, and 
the way it interacts and behaves in the overall system.  
The key individuals and decision makers of the TTP are madrassa 
qualified (religious education only). Among TTP ranks, most of the militants were 
not part of the Afghan Jihad with the U.S.S.R. They follow the ideology of Al-
Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the interests of foreign elements. They do not 
have requisite capability of formulating or modifying ideology at their own without 
the influence of their masters. They are fighters, who take advantage of 
opportunities to remain relevant to the overall environment. Defining the TTP is 
necessary for overall formulation of strategy and coherent response by all 
elements of national power. 
As discussed earlier, the Imam (cleric) responsible for Madrassas and 
mosques is the key influencer at individual level. Those being used for spreading 
extremist/fundamentalist narrative (information domain) of TTP should be the key 
target of any information campaign/policy. Putting checks and balances on the 
clerics can control the information domain at the individual level. It needs to be 
understood that religious freedom is part of democracy but spread of hatred and 
anti-social activities cannot be allowed under the garb of this liberty. 
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2. Identify Target Audience 
Identifying the center of gravity (COG) of the target is important in order to 
make a lasting blow. Information operation is no different from any other military 
campaign. In the TTP’s case, since the battlefield is asymmetric, it is very difficult 
to counter the COG of their insurgency. It is evident from our analysis of TTP that 
their COG is their narrative of Jihad, Holy War, and war against the enemy of 
Islam. It is also clear that we have to fight this narrative at the individual level and 
at the mosques and Madrassas. Battle of narrative has to be won in the cognitive 
domain. This is possible if we generate a counter narrative (in the information 
domain) and propagate it through the physical domain (mosques and 
Madrassas) in order to cut the human resource (fresh recruits) supply for terrorist 
organization. This is yet another reason to bring the madrassa and mosques 
under state control. 
3. Divide and Rule 
The internal differences of TTP were discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
These differences can be easily exploited to weaken the organization. The 
narrative formulated can target existing differences between individuals following 
the Salafi and Deobandi versions, Mehsud (Khalid Mehsud alias Khan Said 
Sajna followers), and non-Mehsud. The TTP differences with Ahmedzai and 
Wazir tribes can also be fueled to neutralize them. The existing differences 
provide a good playing field for information environment manipulation and 
achieving favorable goals. 
C. SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Isolate  
Complete isolation of the TTP as an organization or as a system of 
terrorism may not be possible as effectively as it may be perceived. 
International/regional environment and involvement of religion in Pakistani 
society makes the task difficult. The isolation in the information environment is in 
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terms of cognitive domain. Measures suggested below are the guidelines, 
peculiar to Pakistani information environment, for isolating the COG (narrative) of 
the TTP: 
 Affect a transitional change in thinking of society that we need to 
put our house in order first before worrying about others. As a 
society, we get more worried about what happens to Muslims in 
Palestine, Iraq, Bangladesh, India, Burma and other parts of the 
world rather than mending our ways and making Pakistan a better 
living place. We need to unite the nation through slogans like “This 
is My Pakistan,” which gives ownness and patriotism.  
 Isolate TTP by targeting the cognitive domain of target audiences. 
Propagate differences between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. 
Let the people know that the Afghan Taliban are fighting foreign 
forces, while the TTP is fighting their own people with similar 
religion, country, and culture; therefore their cause cannot be 
comparable. The people whom the TTP is fighting are our sons, 
trying to restore writ of law and provide justice to everyone. 
 The concept of ‘Khawarij’197 needs to be explained to the nation. 
Such followers of Islam were expected to rise and kill others who 
do not copy their way of following the religion. The confusion which 
exists over Muslim killing other Muslims, and who is right and who 
is wrong - needs to be answered by explaining the concept of 
Khawarij, to isolate TTP. 
 Religious scholars, who are known as teachers of Taliban (Maulana 
Sami ul Haq), and who claim to be closely associated with TTP (JUI 
and JI leaders) should be united at the national level under the 
Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). They should engage TTP in peace 
dialogue process. Prepare the nation about what the CII wants from 
TTP (peace and following of true Islamic teachings) and what is the 
outcome of negotiations. Propagate the extremist views of TTP at 
all levels. 
 To isolate TTP effectively, political support of terrorism and role of 
religion in politics will have to be stopped. Once TTP and religious 
terrorism are made unpopular, the political parties will themselves 
avoid getting associated with any such organization due to the fear 
of losing votes. In recent past, to gain public support, Imran Khan (a 
rising politician of Pakistan) advocated dialogue and forgiveness for 
                                            
197 “Who Were The Khawarij?” accessed on August 19, 2014, 
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TTP. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, chief of JUI (F), propagates TTP 
ideology during public addresses; ex-premier of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) 
regarded Hakimullah Mehsud (TTP chief killed in drone strike) as 
‘Shaheed’; PML (N) supports Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to gain political strength; Muthahida Qaumi 
Movement (MQM) and few other political parties carries out killings 
in Karachi for political gains and extortion of money – and the list 
goes on. It is important to devise a mechanism under the judiciary 
to implement laws to bring any worthwhile change. 
 Associate the TTP with anti-state factors like foreign intelligence 
involvement. The Pakistani population is very intolerant towards 
India. Any linkage of TTP and Indian RAW (Indian Intelligence 
Agency) should be made public.,198199 The targeting of P3C-Orion 
in Mehran Base Karachi on May 22, 2011 and Saab-2000 AEW&C 
(Airborne Early Warning and Control) in an attack on Kamra air 
base on August 15, 2012 explains the TTP motives. Both the 
attacks, targeted aircrafts which were strategic assets of Pakistan 
for a conventional war (India as likely enemy). P3C-Orions were for 
long range maritime patrol to widen the influence of Pakistan Navy 
reach in Indian Ocean, and Saab-2000 AEW&C were challenging 
Indian air superiority in the region.200 Both types of aircrafts were 
neither used against TTP and were not a threat to terrorists. The 
issue can be highlighted to unite the nation to fight the TTP, which 
is being used as a foreign tool to weaken Pakistan. 
 To isolate TTP regionally, the government will have to adopt the 
measures as taken by the Sri Lankan government to fight the 
LTTE. Increased diplomatic measures will have to be taken to 
involve international community, especially Indian and Afghan 
governments. Pakistan resolve to help India in fighting terrorism to 
stop incidents like Mumbai attacks, once propagated will help in 
getting some cooperation. Similarly bilateral terrorism pact with 
Afghanistan to help each other in fighting terrorism and out of 
capacity help of Pakistan in accommodating 1.6 million Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan,201 may help is getting Afghan government 
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support. Pakistan may also have to involve the economic stakes of 
countries like Iran (through buying gas) and China (giving corridor 
to Gawadar port) to gain their support and minimize any possible 
involvement in de-stabilizing Pakistan internally.  
 TTP like other terrorist setups is concerned about its image. Omar 
studio that makes an effort to target multi lingual audiences through 
release of audio, video, pamphlets, and FM channels speak of TTP 
efforts to reach out to variety of audiences. The TTP wants 
attention of its target audience, may it be fear / coercive power or 
attraction of its ideology. The government will have to limit 
coverage of the TTP actions, statements, and issues 
supporting/hinting its philosophy. Reports going to media will have 
to be managed. Limited outlets of terrorist related news should be 
allowed for better control and to pre-empt unnecessary alarms. 
Once terrorists are projected in media, they achieve their objective 
and indirectly government and media support their purpose. 
 Vigorously pursue and expose the TTP about the things it does but 
hides from people due to fear of losing popularity. Try to hit the 
cognitive domain of the target audience. Where the views of the 
target audience cannot be changed, as a first step, confusion and 
doubt be created. Let the target audience think about the TTP more 
seriously, especially the the TTP sympathetic audience. Following 
are a few themes that are specific to the current Pakistani 
information environment and could be exploited to confuse pro-TTP 
audience and isolate it:  
 Killing of Muslims in mosques and not targeting brothel 
houses, dance parties, and other non-Islamic activities. 
 Expose the anti-Shia and Ahmedi stance of the TTP. The 
killings of peaceful Shia and Ahmedi community, which is 
completely against religious teachings. 
 Trade of narcotics, illegal commodities, smuggling, 
kidnapping for ransom, and looting for money. All of these 
are non-Islamic acts, which have not been associated with 
TTP in any kind of information campaign or media. 
 TTP leaders caught by U.S. getting help from Afghan 
government. 
 Rivalries and fight for power within TTP; Mehsud dominance 
and differences with other factions. 
 Though the TTP Chief Mullah Fazllulah propagates Jihad 
and sacrifice for greater cause, but fears death (Shahadat) 
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as he escaped military operation of Swat, and is hiding in 
Afghanistan. Is sahadat only meant for poor followers of the 
TTP? 
 Why the love of Jannah is not forcing the TTP to fight Jews 
in Gaza/Palestine? Why they only target Muslims only those 
who follow religion are killed while offering prayer in the 
mosques? 
 Counter TTP propaganda of being true followers of Islam. Quran 
says “Killing an innocent person unjustly is like killing all of mankind 
and saving a person’s life is like saving all of mankind,”202 and what 
the TTP is doing does not make sense. There have been videos 
made by TTP showing its leaders Matini, Jangraiz Khan playing 
football/kicking the chopped-off heads of hostages.203 These anti-
Islamic, anti-human, and brutal acts provide strong bases that 
convincing any kind of audience should be easy. The TTP and 
other religious extremist organizations describe/quote teaching of 
Islam out of context. Such misinterpretations need to be exposed 
and clarified to make audience believe that whatever the TTP or 
religious terrorists say needs verification. Similarly, stopping the 
education of women and not allowing polio vaccines are few 
examples of anti-Islamic practices. 
 To unite the nation and provide strength and motivation to those 
who are fighting the TTP, it is important to portray Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEA) as heroes. The task of affecting the cognitive 
domain of the target audience is not difficult, once TTP is 
continuously making the mistake of publicizing brutal, merciless, 
and inhumane pictures and videos of the slaughtering of pro-
government people, LEA personnel, and Shias.204 Planned and 
well thought out postings of such pictures and videos on social 
media can also earn international sympathy and support. 
 The government should project the negotiation effort with the TTP 
and extend a hand of compromise. The TTP leaders or defected 
leaders may be given a share in provincial government—showing 
their followers the seriousness of the state to address their 
concerns. Imposition of true Sharia (Islamic teachings) will not harm 
Pakistan; instead, it is the TTP version of Sharia that is dangerous. 
                                            
202 Quran, “al-Ma’idah,” verse 5:32, http://quran.com/5/32. 




Confuse the pro-TTP audience to think that their leaders are not 
serious to implement Sharia once government is willing to do it. 
2. Mosques 
Mosque have been used in Pakistan to incite people on the basis of sect, 
Barelvi, Ahl-e-hadis, and Deobandi (discussed in detail in Chapter II). Lal (Red) 
Mosque and Jamia Hafsa are the very recent examples, in which the platform of 
mosque was exploited (details in Chapter V). All the mosques in the country 
should be made accountable. Imam should be appointed by a district 
administration on the basis of qualification/exams; merely memorizing the Quran 
should not be enough to become an imam. Imam should also be given a salary 
from the national exchequer and powers in civil administration so that it becomes 
a lucrative job and people with qualifications/qualities are appointed as Imam. A 
strict ban should be imposed on sectarian preachings. Jumma sermons of every 
mosque should be recorded and scrutinized by district administration and kept in 
a database for any forensic requirements. Mosques must not be used for any 
political gathering or purpose.  
3. Madrassas 
Madrassas have played a very critical role in the rise of religious terrorism 
in Pakistan. The former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, tried to control 
the syllabus of Madrassas and faced serious opposition from religious and 
political parties and organizations. However, control over what is being taught in 
madrassa is the only solution. The word madrassa, when translated into English 
means school, where all types of worldly education can be imparted. Madrassas 
should not act as a radicalization centers; rather, the ultimate product should 
have some technical and worldly education. This would allow the qualified 
student to adjust into society and earn a living, rather than not finding a career 
and ultimately becoming trapped by terrorist organizations. 
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4. Political Solution 
We need to learn from the military operation in Swat (where we still lack 
political/civil strength) and the Sri Lankan defeat of the LTTE, that a political 
solution would be long lasting and productive. As discussed earlier, the TTP 
acquires more sympathizers/strengths when the state uses force. In Swat—
which we regard as a military success and a defeat of TNSM—the civil 
administration is not yet able to stand on its own. To support political solution we 
will have to provide equal justice, develop the areas which are deprived of basic 
amenities and ensure good governance.  
5. Self-Correction in Society 
The slogan of “This is My Pakistan” will give a feeling of own-ness to the 
nation and the responsibility of correcting it. On lines of U.S. campaign, “If You 
See Something, Say Something,” thinking needs to be developed that if 
something is going wrong, every citizen has the responsibility to correct it by 
reporting it. We need to provide critical thinking in the society205 to work on self-
correction, and not get carried away easily by the propaganda. Achieving a 
critical thinking society is only possible through education.  
6. Minimize Past Propaganda 
There are issues from the past which will keep increasing TTP 
sympathizer audience if not treated. A lot of ambiguity exists in the society and 
people sympathize with religious terrorists, thinking that innocent madrassa 
students were killed in the military operation of Lal Masjid.206 Government should 
formulate an enquiry board to investigate the causes and reality of military 
operation. The findings of enquiry should be made public and those responsible 
for any wrong act (if any) be punished to reduce anger; or the reality of wrong 
                                            
205 Linda Elder, and Rush Cosgrove, “Critical Societies - Thoughts from the Past,” 
http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/critical-societies-thoughts-from-the-past/762.  
206 Pakistan Army conducted an operation on a mosque named ‘Lal Masjid’ in Islamabad in 
2007. The operation is supposed to have given rise to pro TTP / religious terrorist view in the 
society. 
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doings and miss-reporting of the incidents needs to be exposed. To give 
credibility to the findings of enquiry, Maulana Abdul Aziz (the head of Lal Masjid 
at the time of military operation) should be made part of the enquiry board. 
Similarly, in Baluchistan, bring the reality of killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti207 to the 
public. Accept the mistake (if proven), punish responsible people or let people 
know the reality. Without such measures our nation would remain confuse and 
the vacuum would be filled by anti-state/terrorist elements. 
7. Protect Civilians 
“An insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the 
support of the civilian population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent 
swims. Galula reminds us that the counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the 
population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent. An insecure 
population will not provide the necessary information to the counterinsurgent.”208  
The coercive power209 used by the TTP will have to be countered by protecting 
the civilian population. Once civilians are sure that they will not be killed or forced 
to send their youth to join TTP ranks, they will themselves push the terrorists 
aside and isolate them. However, under the current situation of Pakistani tribal 
areas in particular, protection of civilians may be difficult.  
8. Fusion Center 
For both short- and long-term measures, Law Enforcement Agencies 
(LEAs) will have to build their capacity to pre-empt any terrorist plot or mount a 
response in minimum possible time, while fighting terrorists. The current structure 
of information sharing among Pakistani LEAs is almost non-existent and mainly 
depends on postal mail or personal contacts. The time consuming procedure 
                                            
207 A Baloch leader, head of Jamhoori Watan Party, who remained as governor and chief 
minister of Balochistan province, was killed in military operation in 2006. 
208 David Galula, Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice (Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 2006), viii. 
209 John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power (University of 
Michigan, 1959), 156. 
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limits the efforts to share/gather information, providing more time to the terrorists 
or perpetrators to escape. Pakistan has put in an effort to centralize the data of 
citizens (by National Database and Registration Authority—NADRA) and 
criminals (by Citizen-Police Liaison Committee-CPLC); however, due to lack of 
education and funds its use in LEAs is limited. Learning a lesson from U.S. 
model of fusion centers to expedite the sharing of information, development of a 
networked environment is needed for information sharing. Data centers may be 
established at the district level having capability of uploading information and 
data, which is viewable at the police station, LEA agent and vehicle level. The 
main hub of fusion data centers should be established at the provincial level for 
better coordination between provinces and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir state. 
Networking diagram is shown in Figure 6. The networked sharing of information 
may be combined to include data of all the crimes and hazards (data of National 
Disaster Management Authority—NDMA). The concept should follow the U.S. 
model of intelligence collection, information sharing, and analysis. To give fusion 
centers more strength and increase their efficacy, existing data of NADRA and 
CPLC should be linked and intelligence agencies be involved to share and 
update information/intelligence.  
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Figure 6.  Fusion center networking diagram 
COPLINK (IBM i2)210 or any other compatible software can be used for 
sharing of information with remote LEA officers/agents. Such software provides 
platform for information sharing and analysis, allows LEAs to track terrorist 
link/associates/networks and helps develop a complete picture with limited input 
of available information, hence enhancing overall efficacy. COPLINK or similar 
softwares also help in generating reports and carrying out analysis based on 
history of incidents. Speedy sharing of information reduces time and helps in pre-
empting terrorism plots.   
The use of information technology for sharing of data and intelligence will 
help in promoting the adoption of technology; which is limited at lower levels of 
LEAs. Fusion centers will also help in improved and well-coordinated 
management of response once multiple agencies are involved.  
                                            
210 IBM, “I2 is now part of IBM,” accessed on September 7, 2014, http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/info/i2software/. 
 97 
Besides numerous advantages, the adoption of technology will incur costs 
on establishing a complete network and its associated maintenance. More 
employees will be required to man and maintain the equipment. Training of 
personnel and alternative means in case of network outages will have to be 
accounted for.  
9. FM Radio Channels 
The TTP chief (also known as Mullah FM or Mullah Radio) is famous for 
use of FM radio channels. In addition to the routine broadcasts propagating 
terrorist ideology and religious programs, TTP / TNSM have been observed 
forcing people to listen to their programs.211 To control the spread of information 
and minimize terrorist use of physical and information domain, no such medium 
should be allowed to be used by terrorist organization to reach audiences. 
Effective monitoring on range of radio channels should be ensured and any 
vacuum filled with state sponsored FM channels. The programs of FM channels 
should include the preaching of religion by religious scholars who have been the 
teachers of key TTP leaders. The traditions, customs, beliefs, and tribal values 
needs to be kept in mind while adopting any campaign to influence target 
audience. 
10. Monitor Websites 
The TTP has been eager to launch its website. The organization launched 
its website which was immediately taken down by the government authorities.212  
Keeping in view the information environment of Pakistan, limited target audience 
of TTP on Internet, and ease of tracking down the users accessing such 
websites, government may allow the website to remain on Internet. The material 
                                            
211 During evening broadcasts name of people who were on the hit list were announced; 
either for supporting government or for not obeying terrorist organization. Money was asked in 
lieu, else the target was killed. Hence, people were forced to listen to the broadcasts. 
212 Sajjad Haider, “Pakistani Taliban website taken down 24 Hours After Launch,” Dawn 
News, April 7, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1098339/pakistani-taliban-website-taken-down-
24-hours-after-launch.  
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and propaganda posted on the website should be closely monitored and the 
frequent users of website be tracked to foil any terrorist plot. Meanwhile, 
launching of fake TTP websites may also be considered to confuse the 
users/followers. Such measure is not suggested for FM/radio channels as the 
audience reached through radio is quite healthy and receivers of radio are 
passive not allowing the listeners to be traced. 
11. Counter DVDs/Videos 
The TTP makes videos of most of its operations and markets them on 
DVDs/CDs or the Internet. Counter propaganda videos may be prepared and 
marketed, saturating medium of communication and confusing the follower about 
genuine and fake. 
a. Create Online Forums  
The TTP mostly targets and fills the vacuum left in teachings of religion 
and lack of knowledge. Online forums can be created to fill up the vacuum with 
authentic teachings of Islam. 
b. Shabnamas/Propaganda Pamphlets 
The TTP uses pamphlets to convey messages of coercion to locals who 
support LEAs, money extortion, or propaganda. To counter these pamphlets 
counter propaganda pamphlets (Shabnamas) may be published. Moreover, 
pamphlets can be prepared that pretend to be masquerading as published by 
terrorist organizations to create confusion and trouble terrorists. 
12. Emergency Laws 
The judicial system of Pakistan has not been supporting the fight against 
terrorism. Majority of apprehended terrorists are freed due to lack of evidence. 
Collection of evidence is difficult under the peculiar environment of FATA and the 
circumstances under which the fight with terrorists is going on. We have 
discussed earlier how U.S. handled the situation with emergency laws. The 
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“Protection of Pakistan Bill” was passed by the National Assembly on July 2, 
2014, which includes such laws and gives additional powers to LEAs for fight 
terrorism. It is hoped that the bill (though passed after 13 year of fight against 
terrorism) once implemented will help in addressing such issues.  
D. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING REPRESENTATION 
System dynamics modeling is a technique that helps manage complexity 
and makes it easier to consider the relationship of multiple interrelated variables 
that interact dynamically over a period-of-time. The interrelated variables get 
adjusted/balanced or aggregated on getting information feedback. Religious 
terrorism (more specifically the TTP) in Pakistan has multiple interrelated factors 
making the situation complex. We have made an endeavor to keep the model 
simple and easy to understand for those without knowledge of dynamic 
modeling. We shall explain some basics of the modeling followed by detailed 
description of our specific models. 
Rectangles represent stocks (reservoirs), double-lined arrows show the 
flow in and out with valves as regulators, small clouds depict connection to the 
world outside scope of discussion and arrows with polarities (+ or -) indicate 
causal influences. A + polarity with an arrow shows that increase (or decrease) in 
one leads to increase (or decrease) on the other, while a—polarity indicates 
increase (or decrease) in one leads to opposite effect on the other. Feedback 
loops are divided into two categories: negative or balancing loops and positive or 
reinforcing loops. Balancing (B) loops oppose the change while reinforcing (R) 
loops amplify whatever is happening. For a better understanding (while reading) 
relate the loop with its color in dotted line and words in italics, with the figure. 
1. Causes of Religious Terrorism 
As discussed earlier, religion is involved in every walk of Pakistani society 
with the Afghan-Soviet war and Pakistan support to Afghans. Figure 7 shows 
causes of religious terrorism in Pakistan. The stock and flow that Madrassas 
played are an important role in increasing the religious motivation rate and thus, 
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religiously motivated people. The nation began supporting the Jihad and the 
support of their Afghan Muslim brothers. With an increase in religiously motivated 
people, the radicalization rate of becoming religious terrorists has also increased. 
From the stock of religious terrorists, the outlet is through removing rate or 
deradicalization rate. The regulation of inflow and out flow to the stocks is the key 
to reduce or increase the quantity of religiously motivated people and religious 
terrorists. The two main loops in the system are both reinforcing.  
 
Figure 7.  Causes of religious terrorism in Pakistan 
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a. R1— Madrassas Terrorism Loop (green color) 
Madrassas with extremist agendas gain strength from other Madrassas 
and the number of religious terrorists in the country. As the number of madrassas 
with extremist agendas increase the radicalization fraction would increase to 
increase the radicalization rate of religiously motivated people fueling up the 
number of religious terrorists. The whole loop reinforces itself and if no measures 
are taken, it may result in an exponential increase in the number of religious 
terrorists (though there would be an effect of factors like population growth etc, 
but they are not being considered for this model). 
b. R2 - Weak Governance Loop (brown color) 
Weak governance gets strength from corruption and insincere political 
leaders and foreign anti state motives. The increase in weak governance 
increases the possibility of establishment or conversion of Madrassas into 
Madrassas with extremist agendas. These madrassas with extremist agendas 
increase the radicalization fraction, which in turn increases the radicalization rate 
and thus the number of religious terrorists. (The radicalization fraction is also 
affected positively by the foreign anti state motives and negatively by the 
economic stability & justice). The increase in number of religious terrorists (and 
other types of terrorists) further weakens governance and helps the foreign anti-
state motives and economic stability & justice to play their role more easily and 
effectively.  
2. Use of Force and Information Environment Control 
Figure 8 shows use of force by military and terrorists/government control 
of the Pakistan’s information environment. Two types of stocks are shown in this 
model; the TTP terrorists stock that increases with the increase in recruitment 
rate, and decreases with terrorists either being de-radicalized or removed 
(removal rate) due to military action or miscellaneous factors (including effect of 
control on information environment). Second stock is of anti-TTP population that 
increases with change in support of neutral or pro-government people to become 
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anti TTP. People exit from anti TTP population stock with change in their thinking 
to become pro TTP thinkers. Next, we shall discuss factors that influence these 
two opposite stocks with the help of three loops (one reinforcing and two 
balancing).  
 
Figure 8.  Use of force and role of information environment 
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a. R – Military Action Loop (Brown Color) 
The number of TTP terrorists increases the percentage of terrorist actions 
which put pressure on conduct of military action. The use of force (military action) 
causes discomfort giving rise to anti-state grievances (which is also fueled by the 
economic instability and injustice). Anti-state grievances help terrorists by 
increasing the recruitment rate. As the recruitment rate increases the number of 
TTP terrorists’ and their terrorist actions increases, forcing the military to take 
action (military action). This completes the loop which reinforces itself showing 
that military action is not the only solution to fight terrorists / TTP. 
b. B1 – Terrorists Action Loop (Green Color) 
The balancing loop of terrorists’ action shows that the use of force (military 
action) and terrorist actions decreases their recruitment rate. The strength of TTP 
terrorists positively affects the number of terrorist actions. More terrorist actions 
force the population to think against the TTP, causing change in support and 
increase in the anti TTP population. The increase in anti TTP population 
adversely affects terrorist recruitment rates, reducing the number of TTP 
terrorists. 
c. B2 – Information Environment Loop (Black Color) 
This balancing loop shows the effectiveness of controlling the information 
environment (abbreviated as effs of control on info envmt in the model figure). As 
TTP terrorists carry out more terrorists actions; they make people change in 
support to become anti TTP population. The strength of anti TTP population 
positively influence the effects of control on information environment, which 
balances / reduces the foreign anti state motives and effect of Al-Qaeda and 
Afghan Taliban ideology, which if not controlled would enhance the recruitment 
rate and the number of TTP terrorists. 
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3. Conclusion (System Dynamics Model) 
The system dynamics modeling strengthens the belief that use of force 
alone may not be a solution to counter terrorism. Good governance may appear 
to be a decisive factor which could handle / counter everything, but in reality if the 
government is effective, sincere and powerful, it would not let the terrorism to 
breed by ensuring economic stability, justice and by keeping a check on all the 
factors giving rise to terrorism. The first model shows weak governance and 
madrassas with terrorism agendas as the main reasons for the rise of religious 
terrorism. The second model explains what role the information environment 
control can play.  
The modeling was not aimed at determining the solution for countering 
TTP / religious extremism, but rather to demonstrate that such options can help 
understand the complexities of the situation. With sufficient data (which was out 
of our research scope), the model can be run to understand and solve the 
complex situation. 
E. ISSUES TO CONSIDER 
The counter measures suggested in this Chapter may not be implemented 
without addressing the concerns mentioned below: 
1. Regional and International Dynamics 
It may not be easy to handle interests/tackle interests of regional and 
international players. The seriousness of regional and international players in 
helping Pakistan is very important. Pakistan cannot handle this menace in 
isolation. Importance of geographic location and interests of international and 
regional players have to be considered. The porous border, huge presence of 
Afghan refugees, cultural and historical affiliation of tribal population with 
Afghans, needs to be taken into account. Our policy must be in line with the 
cultural and historical requirements. Whatever happens in Afghanistan has an 
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effect on northwestern areas of Pakistan. We also have to perceive and plan 
catering for the environment after U.S./ISAF leaves Afghanistan.  
2. Can Democratic Government Take Strict Measures? 
 With existing relations among PML(N), JUI(F), Jamat-e-Islami and 
religious terrorist organizations and terrorist wings of political 
parties like MQM, it may not be easier for a democratic government 
to take strict measures. Political parties are more worried about 
losing their votes. A political government may adopt such measures 
only once the nation is really at the verge/tipping point of accepting 
harsh decisions. 
 The sectarian issues are very critical to handle. With Saudi Arabia 
and Iran supporting both extremes, the conflicts are difficult to 
diffuse. 
 Almost all the measures require good governance and supremacy 
of law and order, which are not currently in very good shape. Will 
we have to wait for governance to improve for the above 
recommended measures? 
 Technical measures would need financial support. Is the nation 
ready to bear this burden? 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Pakistani information environment is peculiar in its architecture, 
influenced by its culture, literacy rate, regional politics, and socio-economic 
conditions of the society. Our research has brought out these peculiarities. We 
believe that in order to counter terrorism in general and TTP in particular within 
this environment, it is important to formulate information operations considering 
these peculiarities. The menace of the TTP (and other like-minded terrorist 
organizations) was not formed overnight, and could not have formed, if there 
were no lawlessness, lack of governance, and socio-economic disparity in 
difference classes of the society. These factors created a vacuum in the political 
system of the country, which gave these insurgents legitimacy in their actions 
through political support from religious parties.  
Fighting the enemy in the physical domain of the information environment 
is easy, whereas to fight in the cognitive domain is the most difficult part. It is 
essentially the fight of Narrative. As Dr John Arquilla213 opines, it is important for 
the information warriors to win the “story of the battle.” To fight insurgency as an 
occupying force (ISAF in Afghanistan) is different than fighting your own people 
(Pak Army against TTP) subject to the same Information environment. The 
dilemma is more complex in situations where a family member is a militant of 
TTP and the other is a soldier in the Army deployed to fight these militants. In 
such a scenario, differentiating between right and wrong becomes cognitively 
very difficult. It is the strength of the narrative, or counter narrative, that  wins the 
day.  
                                            
213 John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, where 
he has taught the special operations curriculum since 1993. He also serves as director of the 
Information Operations Center. His teaching interests revolve around the history of irregular 
warfare, terrorism, and the implications of the information age for society and security, 
http://www.nps.edu/About/News/Faculty/NPSExpert/John-Arquilla.html. 
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As a system, the TTP has a lot of vulnerabilities due to its organizational 
setup. The cohesion of this network or system of networks is its narrative (COG), 
which needs to be countered at the individual level in the information 
environment. Improving government and socio economic conditions of the 
affected area would deny space to the TTP’s influence in the cognitive domain at 
all levels of the information environment. Understanding the physical domain of 
this environment of Pakistan would enable the state to put checks and balances 
on the spread of extremist/radicalized narrative. Political will is required to 
counter this menace, for which legislation and subsequent implementation is 
required at the state level. Use of modern technology requires prudence and that 
is what we have tried to put forward through this thesis. Strategy would entail use 
of technology rather technology driving the strategy. To make this decision it is 
essential to analyze the information environment of the target audience. 
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APPENDIX A. DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATION 
STATISTICS FOR PAKISTAN AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 Year Pakistan Egypt India Iran 
Total population 2009 181,457,277 78,866,635 1,156,897766 75,967,61 
Population 
aged under 
35 (% of total) 




2009 37 43 30 69 
GNI per capita, 
PPP (current 
international $) 
2009 2,680 5,680 3,280 11,470 
Literacy rate (% 
of population 
aged 15 and 
above) 




















2011 2.5 9.1 2.3 n. A 
Table 3.   Development and communication statistics for Pakistan and 
selected countries. Source214: U.S. Census Bureau, World 
Bank Database, Country profiles of UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, ICT Development Index (IDI) established by the 
ITU for 159 countries, Country profiles on the Internet, and 
Facebook statistics by country. 
                                            
214U.S. Census Bureau, Mid-Year-Population by 5-year age groups, International Data Base, 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/groups.php; World Bank Database, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS; Gross National Income (GNI) converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. World Bank Database, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD; Country profiles of UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/tableviewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143; ICT 
Development Index (IDI) established by the ITU for 159 countries with Chad ranking last at a 
value of 0.79 and Sweden first at 7.85. ITU 2010, 10; Country profiles on Internet World Stats, 
http://www.Internetworldstats.com/; Facebook statistics by country, Social bakers, 
http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics, accessed August 10, 2012. 
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APPENDIX B. MAP OF KYBER PAKHTOONKHWA AND FATA 
 
Figure 9.  Map of Kyber Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA215  
                                            
215 Zar Ali Khan, “What is FATA?” Fata Reforms, accessed on September 7, 2014, 
http://www.fatareforms.org/what-is-fata/. 
KPK   - 
FATA -  
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APPENDIX C. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN 
A. RELIGION BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
Today, religion and terrorism have found roots within each other. Role of 
religious organizations in country politics has made it difficult to refute the 
extremist views. 
1. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI)  
In 1980, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, along with two associates, founded Jamiat 
Ansarul Afghaneen. After the Afghan-U.S.SR War, the organization was 
transformed into HuJI with focus on supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle. 
HuJI follows the Deobandi school of thought and describes itself as a “second 
line of defense for every Muslim.” The organization focuses on establishing 
Islamic rule by waging war. HuJI is inspired by Osama bin Laden and the 
Taliban. It has an affiliate in Bangladesh called HuJI-B. The Bangladeshi HuJI 
has been using slogan, ‘Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan’ 
(we will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan). With 
U.S. operation in Afghanistan, HuJI shifted its base to South Waziristan Agency 
(FATA) in Pakistan, and its men fled to Central Asia, Chechnya, and FATA. The 
leader of HuJI Qari Saifullah Akhtar escaped to Saudi Arabia and he was later 
apprehended by Dubai authorities in 2004, and handed over to Pakistan. In 
2007, he was released in Pakistan due to lack of evidence. Qari Saifullah Akhtar 
graduated from Banuri Masjid Karachi and played a key role in Mufti Shamzai’s 
efforts to unite Osama bin Laden and Mullah Umar for Jihad. He remained as an 
adviser to Mullah Umar during Taliban regime. Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s men were 
called Punjabi Taliban and were offered employment by Mullah Umar.216 Due to 
contribution of HuJI, Mullah Omar allowed the organization to build six more 
‘maskars’ (training camps) in Kandahar, Kabul, and Khost, where the Taliban 
                                            




army and police also received military training. HuJI has also been involved in 
campaigns inside Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. At one time, HuJI 
became the biggest Jihadi militia based in Kandahar.217 Qari Saifullah Akhtar 
was again arrested in 2008, for suicide bombing in Karachi (targeted at former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) but was released by court due to lack of 
evidence. HuJI, reportedly has links in 24 countries, including India, Chechnya, 
Uzbekistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Iran, Malaysia, Fiji, UK, U.S., 
Ireland, the Philippines, and parts of Africa and the West Asia. HuJI was declared 
a terrorist outfit by U.S. in 2003, and its assets were frozen in U.S. in 2008. 
2. Harkat-ul-Ansar (Now Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) 
During the Afghan war with U.S.S.R., two organizations (Harkat-ul-Jihad-
al-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) merged to form Harkat-ul-Ansar,218 led by 
Maulana Saadatullah Khan. U.S. declared Harkat-ul-Ansar a terrorist group in 
1997, due to its association with Osama bin Laden, after which the organization 
changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Harkat-ul-Ansar has reportedly 
participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Kashmir, Myanmar, Tajikistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Pakistan the focus of organization remained on 
supporting the freedom struggle in Kashmir. Over a period-of-time, the main 
ideologue Masood Azhar, commander in Kashmir Sajjad Afghani and many other 
leaders were apprehended. In 1999, Sajjad Ghani was killed in Pakistan while 
attempting a jail break in. Many of the Harkat-ul-Ansar men joined Lashar-e-
Taiba, and after Masood Azhar was released from Indian prison (in a trade-off 
after Indian Airline flight hijacking), he formulated Jaish-e-Muhammad. Harkat-ul-
Ansar is reportedly no more functional. 
                                            
217 Ibid. 




3. Jaish-e-Muhammed (Army of the Prophet) 
Jaish-e-Muhammad219 was formulated by Maulana Masood Azhar in 
January 2000, after his release from Indian jail. Before the arrest in 1999, 
Maulana Masood Azhar was managing Harkat-ul-Ansar and by the time he was 
released his old outfit was declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. In 2001, 
Maulana Masood Azhar was arrested in Pakistan, following the December 13, 
2001 attack on Indian parliament. In 2002, Lahore High Court ordered his release 
due to lack of proof. Jaish-e-Muhammed reportedly is famous for suicide attacks 
on Indian security forces’ bases, camps, and convoys. The organization has 
close ties with former Taliban regime of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda. 
4. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) also Known as Jammat-ud-Dawa (JuD) 
LeT220 was formed in 1990 at Kunar Afghanistan. The organization is 
headed by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. LeT has been declared a terrorist 
organization and banned by U.S., UK, and Pakistan governments in 2001 and 
2002. 
LeT cadre comes from the Wahabi school of thought, and its agenda, as 
given in a pamphlet titled ‘Why are we waging Jihad,’ includes restoration of 
Islamic rule all over India and to unite all Muslim majority regions in countries that 
surround Pakistan.221 The LeT is involved in the Kashmir freedom struggle, 
Chechnya and other parts of Central Asia. The LeT does not believe in 
democracy and nationalism. The organization professes that it is the duty of 
every Muslim to protect and defend (through Jihad) interests of Muslims all over 
the world. The LeT cadre comes from Pakistan and Afghanistan with small 
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contributions from Sudan, Bahrain, Central Asia, Turkey, and Libya. The LeT 
men are also participating in new Jihadi fronts like Iraq. The organization is 
alleged to have support from its affiliates in U.S. and Australia. 
The LeT has links with International Sikh Youth Federation (Lakhbir Singh 
Rode) and other religious organizations to include Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen of 
Egypt and some Arab groups. The organization is financially supported by its 
community in Pakistan, Persian Gulf, United Kingdom, and Islamic Non-
Governmental Organizations. The LeT runs Islamic institutions, schools, medical 
services across Pakistan. The organization makes use of its website 
(http://www.jamatuddawa.org/), an Urdu monthly journal (Al-Dawa), which has a 
circulation of 80,000, and an Urdu weekly (Gazwa). It also publishes Voice of 
Islam, an English monthly, and Al-Rabat - monthly in Arabic, Mujala-e-Tulba - 
Urdu monthly for students, Jehad Times–Urdu Weekly.  
5. Ummah Tamir-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah) 
A scientist from Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Sultan 
Bashiruddin Mahmood, resigned in year 1999 to form UmmahTamir-e-Nau 
(UTN).222 The UTN was registered as a non-governmental Afghan relief agency, 
and most of its key figures included learned people with strong social standings. 
In 2001, Bashiruddin Mahmood was arrested for alleged links with Al Qaeda. 
UTN calls itself “an organization engaged in relief, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction activities.” The UTN refers to the greater Islamic community, 
transcending national boundaries. The organization has been involved in 
voluntary work including education reforms, rebuilding schools, hospitals, 
providing medical supplies, mobile health units, and school books. Bashiruddin 
Mahmood worked on land development research to find alternate crops in 
Afghanistan as Taliban banned the production of poppy. The Taliban government 
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permitted UTN to operate in Afghanistan and to conclude business agreements 
on behalf of the government.  
The UTN has ties with Al Rashid Trust, and indirect ties with Al Qaeda and 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). It is also alleged that Bashiruddin Mahmood’s team 
was trying to develop nuclear technology for Osama Bin Laden by smuggling 
nuclear materials from Russia and Central Asian States. According to Pakistani 
intelligence officials, travel of UTN officials to Afghanistan and their visas were 
sponsored by the Taliban’s Ministry for Mines and Industries. Bashiruddin 
Mahmood is reported to have termed Pakistan’s nuclear capability as “the 
property of the whole Ummah.” 
6. Al Rashid Trust 
Al Rashid Trust223 is based in Karachi. It was declared a terrorist group by 
the U.S. State Department in 2001 and its accounts were frozen by the State 
Bank of Pakistan. The trust was founded as a welfare organization by Mufti 
Muhammed Rashid in February 1996. The mandate of trust was expanded to 
include relief activities for Muslims in Chechnya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Al 
Rashid Trust shares the Deobandi school of thought with the Taliban and 
promotes Jihad at places where muslims are being oppressed. Some of its 
members are alleged to have received military training in Afghanistan. 
Its literature denounces U.S. for its policies toward Israel, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia and praises Islamist terrorists. Al Rashid Trust publishes an Urdu 
newspaper Zarb-e-Momin and an English paper Dharb-e-Momin; it also runs a 
radio station out of Kabul. The newspaper has a website that specifically 
endorses the Taliban’s style of governance and is widely considered to be the 
mouthpiece of the Taliban. The head of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Maulana 
Masood Azhar, is reported to have published articles in both Zarb-e-Momin and 
Dharb-e-Momin. As per Maulana Masood Azhar, the efforts of Al Rashid Trust 
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have given strength to the Taliban. Al Rashid Trust and JeM are reported to 
share office spaces and working strength, where required. The trust reportedly 
manages foreign funds of JeM and was one of Osama bin Laden’s sources of 
income. The trust is linked with the Taliban, Al Qaeda, JeM and many other 
Islamic terrorist organizations. In Afghanistan, it coordinates its activities with an 
Arab NGO, Wafa Khairia, which was formed by Osama bin Laden and other 
Arab-Afghans as a reciprocal gesture for being provided hospitality in 
Afghanistan. 
7. Lashkar-al-Zil (Shadow Army) 
Lashkar-al-Zil (also known as Jaish-al-Usrah) is a terrorist outfit linked with 
Al-Qaeda, and is the descendant of Al Qaeda’s 55th Brigade (the elite guerrilla 
group).224 It was formed in 1990s during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and is 
thought to operate in Somalia and Yemen.225 The Lashkar comprises Afghan and 
Pakistani Taliban, 313 Brigades, Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan, and former Iraqi 
Republican Guards.226 Lashkar-e-Zil has reportedly been involved in attacks on 
Camp Chapman (December 30, 2009)227 and Azad Kashmir Pakistan (January 6, 
2010).228 
                                            
224 Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,” The Long War Journal 5 (2) (2009), 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php.  




226 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “U.S. spies Walked into Al-Qaeda’s Trap,” Asia Times, January 
5, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA05Df01.html.  
227 Ibid. 
228 Amir Mir, “Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir Suicide Hits,” The News International, 
January 11, 2010, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=217998&Cat=2&dt=1/10/2010.  
 119 
8. Haqqani Network  
The Haqqani network has its roots from the beginning of the Afghan-
U.S.SR war, when it was supported by the CIA and ISI.229 Reportedly, key 
figures like Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden, both began the Jihadist fight 
under the umbrella of the Haqqani Network. The Network is an affiliate of the 
Afghan Taliban with separate command and control setup. It follows the same 
ideology as the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani, is the current head of the Haqqani 
network, with the base of the network in North Waziristan Agency (FATA). The 
network enjoys close ties with Al-Qaeda and other foreign extremists in Pakistan. 
It is considered as “the most resilient enemy network” by the U.S. military 
commanders in Afghanistan.230 The Haqqani Network was declared a terrorist 
organization by the U.S. government in 2012. The network gets financial support 
from Persian Gulf area, extortions, kidnappings, and smuggling.231 
The U.S. and coalition forces have been able to disrupt and degrade the 
network with increased special operations and drone campaigns. The Pakistan 
military has also launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb (in June/July 2014) in North 
Waziristan Agency (the base of Haqqani Netwrok) to sweep and clear the area 
from terrorists. However, it is considered that despite recent progress, the 
Network can regenerate if not continually pressured by Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.232 
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9. Al Akhtar Trust 
The Al Akhtar Trust233 was founded in Karachi in November 2000, and is 
headed by Muhammad Mazhar. The main objective of the trust was to support 
Islamic organizations, including Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The trust was 
declared a terrorist entity in 2003 by the U.S. for supporting terrorism, assisting 
Al Qaeda, and raising money for attacks in Iraq. The U.S. Treasury Department 
has alleged that the trust has been treating injured Al Qaeda’s terrorists in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The trust is also linked with an individual believed to 
be part of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl’s abduction and killing. U.S. 
government indicated that the Al Akhtar Trust is performing the activities of Al 
Rashid Trust and both trusts have been supporting Al Qaeda financially. 
Reportedly, other terrorist organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have 
been using two registered humanitarian aid agencies in Pakistan (Al Akhtar Trust 
and Al Khair Trust) to deliver arms and ammunition to its men. The Al Akhtar 
Trust is also linked with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). The 
State Bank of Pakistan froze the bank accounts of Al Akhtar Trust in 2003.  
10. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen 
The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen organization234 was formed in September 1989 by 
Master Ahsan Dar in Kashmir. It is presently headed by Syed Salahudeen, and is 
reportedly regarded as an offshoot of Jamaat-e-Islami (a known religious political 
party in Pakistan) formed to counter Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF), which holds the agenda of making Kashmir an independent state (not 
part of Pakistan or India). Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was able to redirect? many 
members of JKLF. The strength of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is estimated to be at least 
1500. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is also reported to have contacts with Afghan 
Mujahideen groups like Hizb-e-Islami, and its cadre has allegedly been receiving 
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training from experienced Afghan Mujahideens. Most of the activities of Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen are linked with Kashmir struggle. After year 2000, Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen developed differences and two factions were formulated; one 
following Syed Salahudeen and its chief commander Abdul Majeed Dar. Both the 
factions have been reportedly involved in countering each other’s strength. Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen is also believed to have links with Student Islamic Movement of 
India. 
11. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) (Movement 
for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws) 
TNSM, a Wahabi militant organization,235  was founded by Maulana Sufi 
Muhammad in 1992 to impose Sharia (Islamic law) in Pakistan along the lines of 
the old Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 1998, Maulana Sufi Mohammed 
declared that people who opposed Sharia in Pakistan were worthy of death. He 
declared democracy as un-Islamic. After his apprehension by law enforcement 
agencies in Pakistan, his son-in-law Maulana Fazalullah (the current chief of the 
TTP) became the head of TNSM. In September 1998, TNSM threatened to 
attack American property and abduct Americans in Pakistan unless U.S. 
apologized to the Muslims for the August 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan. 
TNSM cadres have been actively involved in fight against U.S. and coalition 
forces. The organization established parallel free Sharia courts in the Malakand. 
The proceedings of the courts used to be in Pushto instead of Urdu (the national 
language of Pakistan). 
TNSM also set up illegal FM radio stations in the Bajaur area to gather 
men and funds to support Taliban and convince people about TNSM version of 
Islam. In February, 2006 political authorities of the government closed illegal FM 
radio channels in different parts of the Bajaur Agency. In 2009, Pakistan military 
launched operation in Swat area to wipe out terrorists. Area was cleared and 
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Maulana Fazlullah fled to Afghanistan. He later became head of the TTP after the 
death of Hakimullah Mehsud. 
12. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Alami (HuMA) 
HuMA236 stemmed out of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) in 2002 after 
differences over organizational affairs. In addition to other objectives, HuMA also 
aims at hurting U.S. and her allies. HuMA has a consultative committee which 
decides about terrorism targets. The organization’s significant terrorist act was a 
failed assassination attempt on President Pervaiz Musharraf in 2002. Chief of 
HuMA, Muhammad Imran, and deputy chief Muhammad Hanif were arrested and 
subsequently sentenced to death in 2003 by an Anti-Terrorism Court in Karachi. 
Most of the top leadership (including chief and deputy chief) are under arrest. 
HuMA has links Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Taliban 
and Al Qaeda.  
B. SECTARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
Sectarian strife is the second prominent source of militancy in the society. 
Few of the major sectarian militant organizations are described below: 
1. Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) (Movement of the Followers 
of Shia Sect) 
Tehreek Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafria (TNFJ)237 was founded by Imam Jafar Sadiq 
in 1979, after Islamic revolution in Iran. TNFJ aimed to spread the ideas of 
Iranian revolution leader Ayatollah Khomeini, in Pakistan. TNFJ was transformed 
into Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) in 1992. Due to a difference in ideology, 
the organization split into two parts; one headed by Hamid Musawi, the follower 
of Ayatollah Sheriate-Madari, who continues to use the old name of TNFJ; the 
other headed by Arif Husseini, the follower of Ayatollah Khomeini’s thoughts. TJP 
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aims to create Shia society, protect rights of their community, coordinate efforts 
of various Shiite groups and fight against imperialism. Other affiliates of TJP 
include Sipah-e-Abbas, Sipah-e-Ahle-Bait, Imamia Students Organizations and 
Imamia Organizations. To counter Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP –a Sunni 
sectarian organization), a sub-group of TJP, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan 
(SMP) has emerged as a terrorist outfit, and has been involved in anti-SSP 
campaigns, target killings, and other terrorist acts. The sectarian violence in 
Pakistan emerged during/after the Afghan war against the U.S.SR. Mujahideen 
returned from Afghanistan with weapons and arms and joined such sectarian 
organizations to continue fighting, as most of them did not fit into the peaceful 
society. Rivalry between SSP and TJP continues and both sides level the score 
of killing each other’s’ cadre. In 1990, SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was 
killed, followed by the killing of an Iranian diplomat. In 1997, Jhangvi’s successor 
Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi was killed in Lahore and in response, an Iranian diplomat 
was killed in Multan. In 2000, 13 persons were killed in Shia mosque for which 
adjacent Sunni mosque was used. The fight between both sectarian 
organizations continues and they still target each other at present. 
2. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) 
The city of Jhang is located in central Punjab where the majority of land 
owners were Shias who controlled the society and politics of the area. Sunni’s in 
the area revived their strength with financial power of trading, shop keeping, and 
transport. After the Iranian revolution, the Sunni community challenged the 
growing power of Shia’s that resulted in formulation of Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan238 by four Sunni religious scholars in 1985. SSP is alleged to be 
involved in targeting Shia sect inside Pakistan. It also appeared as a political 
party and contested elections in 1993. One of the SSP leaders became minister 
in the coalition government in Punjab. In 2002, Pakistan government banned the 
organization; as a result, SSP renamed itself as Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan. SSP 
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wants Pakistan to be a Sunni state and declares Shiites as non-muslims. It also 
aims to restore Khilafat system with Sunni Shariat (law). Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi, a 
leading SSP leader said in an interview in January 1998, “the government gives 
too much importance to the Shias. They are everywhere, on television, radio, in 
newspapers and in senior positions. This causes heartburn.” SSP is against 
Pakistan support of the U.S. fight against terrorism. It supports the Sunni Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. SSP joined various religious political parties in Pakistan to 
form Afghan Jehad Council and declared U.S. actions against Taliban as un-
Islamic, and therefore, it was essential for the Muslims to declare Jehad against 
the U.S. and its allies. 
There has been a history of assassination of the SSP chiefs. Maulana Haq 
Nawaz Jhangvi, one of the founding members of the SSP was assassinated in 
1990. Maulana Haq Nawaz declared Shias as Kafir (infidel) and instructed his 
men to promote terrorism in the country to declare the Shias’ as Kafir. After 
Jhangvi’s death, Maulana Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi became the head of SSP and 
was assassinated in 1997. Maulana Azam Tariq, SSP chief and a Member of the 
National Assembly, was assassinated in 2003. Azam Tariq was a frequent visitor 
to Afghanistan during Taliban regime. The Sunni extremist outfit is reported to 
blame Iran as the sponsor of Shia extremism in Pakistan. Hence, whenever a 
Sunni leader is assassinated, they begin killing Iranians and Shias in Pakistan. 
SSP is also part of the Afghan Jihad Council that declares war against U.S. 
forces whenever they use Pakistani soil to fight the Taliban regime. Saudi Arabia 
(Sunni dominant) has reportedly been supporting the SSP financially to counter 
Shia’s and Iran’s dominance. The SSP has also been linked to Ramzi Ahmed 
Yousuf, one of the accused in the New York World Trade Centre bombing of 
1993 (2001?). 
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3. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 
LeJ239 is a breakaway faction of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) due to 
differences in following the ideology of founder of SSP, Maulana Haq Nawaz 
Jhangvi. LeJ was founded by Akram Lahori and Riaz Basra, as a Sunni 
Deobandi sectarian organization in 1996. The organization aims to make 
Pakistan a Sunni state. LeJ was banned in Pakistan in 2001. Akram Lahori, has 
reportedly been involved in many terrorist acts including the killing of 
Ehtishamuddin Haider (brother of then Federal Interior Minister Moinuddin 
Haider) and Pakistan State Oil Managing Director Shoukat Raza Mirza (all on 
sectarian grounds). Riaz Basra was involved in more than 300 terrorist incidents. 
He managed to cause so much fear that the former Prime Minister of Pakistan 
stopped attending open courts on receipt of a threatening letter from Basra. The 
leadership of LeJ consists of people who participated in the Afghan-Soviet war. 
LeJ is organized into independent (no contact with other) small cells of 
approximately five to eight people. In 2000, LeJ had split into two groups, one 
headed by Riaz Basra and the other by the Qari Abdul Hai, alias Talha, to 
address whether to resume ethnic strife. As per media reports, the SSP closed 
links with LeJ, despite their initial differences. Reportedly, LeJ did not have a 
shortage of manpower despite deaths and arrests. Both the SSP and the LeJ 
closed links with the Taliban and played an active role in killing Shias during 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. LeJ also reported to have links with Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen (HuM), and many of LeJ fighters have participated in the Kashmir 
freedom struggle. The organization also maintains links with Jaish-e-Muhammad 
(JeM) and Al Qaeda. The LeJ receives financial aid from sympathizers in 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. LeJ does not openly interact with the media and 
relies only on Fax messages and press releases. 
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C. ETHNIC ORGANIZATION – BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION ARMY (BLA) 
BLA was made by the Soviet secret agency KGB to support her greater 
design in the region after over-powering Afghanistan. KGB built BLA around BSO 
(Baloch Students Organization) to cause unrest in Pakistan.240 The ideology 
given to the organization was a stand against the injustice done by the Pakistan 
government in controlling the wealth of Baluchistan, not following through with 
requisite development in the province, and unjust distribution of jobs to deprive 
Baluchis. In February 1973, law enforcement agencies of Pakistan raiding the 
Embassy of Iraq in Islamabad found huge quantity of small arms, ammunition, 
grenades and other supplies, which were supposed to be for Baloch rebels.241 
BLA remained active during the Afghan-Soviet war but the movement died down 
once the Soviet Union left Afghanistan and its main funding source diminished. It 
got recognized as Baluchistan Liberation Army in year 2000. The seed of 
discontentment sowed by KGB is still being used by RAW242 (Indian intelligence 
agency) and others to fulfil their interests in the area as stated by Sasha (KGB 
agent) “RAW must have jumped at the chance because last July [2010] the 
‘discretionary grants’ budget [a euphemism for espionage fund] was increased by 
700 percent in the Indian consulates in Kandahar.”243 Other smaller allies of BLA 
include Baloch Liberation Front, Baloch Republican Army, Lashkar-e-
Baluchistan, Baluchistan Liberation United Front and BSO (Azad). BLA 
separatists aim to form a sovereign state of Greater Baluchistan, including 
Pakistani, Iranian, and Afghanistan Baluchistan territories. The BLA was declared 
a terrorist organization by Pakistan and the UK. The Pakistan government has 
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accused India,244245 of supporting the BLA. The outfit carries out frequent terrorist 
attacks in Baluchistan to terrorize pro-government supporters and to disrupt the 
supply of natural gas coming from Baluchistan. In a recent terrorist activity in 
June 2013, the BLA attacked the Baluchistan residence of Quaid-e-Azam 
(founder of Pakistan and regarded as the father of the nation), burned the 
building, and replaced the Pakistani flag with the BLA flag.  
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